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Disentangling the Repurchase Announcement
An Event Study to the Purpose of Repurchases
Robin Wilber
ABSTRACT

Researchers have consistently shown that a firm’s repurchase announcement is
met with positive abnormal stock price return reactions. Open-market repurchases are
extremely flexible, non-committal and non-punitive; thus, it is puzzling that the mere
announcement of an open-market repurchase will likely increase a firm’s stock price. I
propose to disentangle a firm’s choice to repurchase its stock to determine when a
repurchase announcement is good news for shareholders and when the announcement is
not.
I find that the purpose of the repurchase announcement matters. At the
announcement date, managers’ intention of avoiding dilution is significantly negative and
enhancing shareholder value is significantly positive, as expected. However, more
interesting results are observed at two-years and three-years post announcement where I
show that counteracting dilution is not a good reason to conduct a repurchase and,
although not as strongly negative, enhancing shareholder value does not bear out its
announcement promise. Furthermore, I find that firms that repurchase their shares to
finance an acquisition are well compensated for their efforts, especially in the long run. I

iii

attribute their success to higher cash flows resulting from reducing their tax burden with
their amortization deduction of the goodwill created from the purchase accounting
acquisition.

iv

Chapter 1
Introduction

It is well documented that when firms announce repurchase intentions, their stock
price, on average, increases during the repurchase announcement window1 and the
increases are persistent.2 A common explanation for this is that firms repurchase their
stock when the managers believe that it is undervalued (Dittmar (2000)); thus, the
repurchase activity signals undervaluation to the market. Another frequently suggested
explanation for the positive stock price reaction to a firm’s repurchase announcement is
that a repurchase is a good use of the firm’s free cash flows (Jensen (1986)). It is also
suggested that repurchases may also provide for a better distribution of cash than
dividends because of their temporary and flexible commitment (Jagannathan, Stephens
and Weisbach (2000)).3 This is likely one reason why companies choose to distribute
cash to shareholders as repurchases over dividend increases.4

1

Dann, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995.
Conrad and Kaul, 1993, and Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990.
3
See also Guay and Harford, forthcoming JFE. Lie, 2000, finds positive stock price reactions related to
self-tender offers and also large special dividends and not for regular dividend increases.
4
Liang and Sharpe, 1999, report that in 1997 and 1998, share repurchases by S&P 500 companies
exceeded dividend payments to common stockholders. Also, non-bank S&P 500 firms tripled their
repurchases from 1994 to 1998 reaching $150 billion. Over the same period dividends rose only 35% to
$115 billion. In another study, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 2000, report that between 1996 and
1998, more than 4,000 open-market repurchases were announced, which if fully completed, would amount
to approximately $550 billion. During this same period cash dividends totaled $490 billion. Weston and
Siu, 2002, show repurchases as a percentage of dividends growing from 31.4 percent to 68.1 percent from
1994 to 1998. Despite different data sets, the empirical evidence establishes a higher growth in repurchases
than dividends over the 1990s.
2

1

The increased use of open-market repurchases has coincided with an increasing
reliance on stock options to compensate top managers. Stock options encourage managers
to choose repurchases over conventional dividend payments because repurchases, unlike
dividends, do not reduce the stock price (Jolls (1998)). In a 1994-1998 sample of S&P
500 firms, gross repurchases reduced shares outstanding two percent annually; but, owing
to the exercise of employee stock options, only about half of those shares were actually
retired (Liang and Sharpe (1999)). Thus, it appears that repurchases are not only
announced to signal undervaluation and as an appropriate use of free cash flow, but may
also be conducted to cover options previously committed by the firm. Kahle (2002)
suggests that if firms are repurchasing shares to fund employee stock options, then in an
efficient market the announcement period return should not be as positive as if the
repurchase were due to undervaluation or free cash flow. Signaling undervaluation or an
effective use of cash flow are well-documented viable hypotheses that support the
positive stock price reactions observed with the repurchase announcement.
Since it is well known that on average stock prices increase after a repurchase
announcement, it is possible that firm managers announce repurchases for opportunistic
reasons. A firm manager’s options would increase in value if the stock price increased at
the mere mention of a repurchase. Furthermore, an increase in stock price would support
more favorable terms for an acquiring firm in a stock-financed acquisition.
I propose that not all repurchase announcements carry the same message. With
this in mind, I propose to contribute to this increasingly important payout choice by

2

disentangling the repurchase announcement and distinguishing between a “good news”
repurchase and a “no good news” repurchase.5
In chapter 2, I use standard event-study analysis to investigate the stock price
return reaction to firms announcing a repurchase for possibly opportunistic reasons such
as to facilitate an acquisition, to counteract dilution effects and to cover options.
Consistent with others, I find persistence in positive abnormal returns; however, the
possibly opportunistic reasons are less positive. Furthermore, the repurchase purpose of
counteracting dilution shows significant negative results at two-years and three-years post
announcement and although not as strong, enhancing shareholder value does not bear out
its announcement promise. The strongest positive reason to conduct a repurchase is to
initiate or to fund an employee stock option plan.
Since it is very likely that opportunistic behavior is motivated by the level of
executive ownership in the firm, I investigate the return reaction while controlling for
current ownership levels and also controlling for option ownership level of the firm’s
chief executive. Consistent with agency theory, I find the best abnormal three-years post
announcement return performance is with firms in which CEOs own one to five percent
of the stock and are compensated with a medium level of options. Unexpectedly, I find
the best two-year return performance is with firms in which the CEOs own no stock and
receive no options. This group also has the distinction of being the second best performer
5

Harford, 1997, recognizes that repurchases afford managers with the opportunity to behave
opportunistically. In his investigation of Dutch-auction and fixed-price tender offer he argues that managers
who are also shareholders can choose to participate or not in tendering their shares. If they choose to hold
they are essentially putting their wealth at risk (especially if the signal is false). Thus, Harford argues
managers could choose to participate in overpriced offers and not participate in underpriced offers. Using
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at three years post announcement. This suggests that option granting and CEO ownership
do not influence performance, or that the cost of the options outweigh the benefit of
improved CEO performance.
In chapter 3, I focus on firms that choose to conduct a repurchase of their own
stock in order to facilitate an acquisition. This activity seems puzzling in that if a firm has
the cash available to repurchase its stock and thus could use cash directly for an
acquisition. Thus, it seems odd that a firm should take an extra transactional step to
acquire another firm, which might result in a loss of time and corporate value.6 Also
puzzling is the research that shows that cash-financed acquisitions perform better than
stock-financed acquisitions. At first glance it would appear that firms are taking on
additional transactions and on average might perform poorer. I find that this is not the
situation. Firms that take on the extra financing step are well compensated for their
efforts, especially in the long run. These firms have cash available and positive earnings,
but on average have negative abnormal returns prior to their repurchase announcements.
Thus, these firms are likely to be undervalued and therefore choose this method of
financing to signal undervaluation in the market place. Furthermore, the stock acquisition
step allows these firms to share risk with the target firms, counteract the negative effects
of dilution by repurchasing their shares first, and enjoy a tax advantage for their efforts.
Most research to date has exclusively focused on the open-market repurchase. The
Securities Data Corporation (1994 – date) now tracks Dutch-auction (2% of all

probit analysis Harford finds that managers do not behave opportunistically, but rather set terms that offer
to maximize shareholder wealth.

4

repurchases announced in 2000), fixed-price tender-offers (3percent), negotiated
(4percent), and open-market negotiated (58percent), in addition to often-studied openmarket repurchases (33percent). I will include open-market repurchases, Dutch-auction
and fixed-price tender offers in this study and control for the announcement by the level
of option granting and the motivation of the repurchase as indicated by management.
Furthermore, most research has not had the advantage of the last few years of data.
Original research on repurchases and options was carried out through a long-period of a
bull market. Due to the market downturns of the past four years, I have the advantage of
studying repurchase and options during both an increasing return market and a decreasing
return market.
In order to accomplish this, I use the Securities Data Corporation Platinum
database to determine that my sample of firms to be those that have chosen to repurchase
their shares by the board’s announcement date(s), the type of repurchase conducted, and
the firm’s stated reason for conducting. Information on executive compensation and
option variables are taken from S&P ExecuComp database. Finally, the stock price return
data is obtained from CRSP and many of my control variables from Compustat.

6

Most research has shown that stock-financed acquisitions decrease the market value of the bidding firm.
See Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling; 1989; Servaes, 1991; and Dennis and
McConnell, 1986.

5

Chapter 2
When is a repurchase announcement not good news?

In recent years, firms have disbursed more cash to shareholders in the form of
repurchases than in the form of dividends,7 thus the rationale for repurchasing acquires
added importance. In this chapter, I investigate the reported purpose of such repurchases
to see if the repurchases carry the positive stock price reactions documented by others
and I find that the underlying purpose matters. Since 1995, firms reported the following
purposes for their repurchase: to enhance shareholder value; to counteract dilution; to
fund a stock option plan; to indicate undervaluation; to fund an acquisition; to support an
employee benefit plan; and for general business purposes. As examples of purposes
mattering, I find that at the announcement date, managers’ intention of avoiding dilution
carries significantly negative returns and I also find that enhancing shareholder value is
significantly positive. Moreover, when the results are observed at two-years and threeyears post announcement they are even more interesting. For example, counteracting
dilution is negative and thus is not a good reason to conduct a repurchase and although
not as negative, enhancing shareholder value does not bear out its announcement promise
at the two-year and three-year periods.

7

Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 2000; Liang and Sharpe, 1999.

6

The organization of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first part discusses the
choice between repurchases and dividends, theoretical underpinnings of free cash flows
and undervaluation and the research results, the repurchase choice and the influence of
management options. The second section develops the hypotheses and methodology. The
third section reports the empirical findings and the last section summarizes and concludes
the chapter.

Literature Review
Repurchase or Dividend Decision
During the 1990s, firms chose to disburse more cash to stockholders in the form
of repurchases than in the traditional form of dividend payments. In 1997 and 1998, in
fact, share repurchases by S&P 500 companies exceeded dividend payments to common
stockholders. In fact, non-bank S&P 500 firms tripled their repurchases from 1994 to
1998 to $150 billion. Over the same period dividends rose only 35 percent to $115 billion
(Liang and Sharpe (1999)). Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest that repurchases are an
equivalent substitute for dividends. They show that the market reaction to dividend cuts is
not significantly different from zero for firms that also repurchase their shares. Grullon
and Michaely argue that repurchase programs should be superior to dividend payouts
because repurchases disburse cash in a way that reduces shareholder tax liability.
Repurchases also offer the firm flexibility in making payments and as such there
is no long-term commitment associated with the methods of disbursement. A dividend
increase suggests a permanent plan for disbursement. Jagannathan, Stephens and
Weisbach (2000) suggest that dividends are paid by firms with higher permanent

7

operating cash flows and repurchases are paid by firms with higher temporary nonoperating cash flows.

Free Cash Flows or Undervaluation
Many researchers have documented abnormal positive stock price returns to firms
that repurchase their shares.8 These researchers have found that positive cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) occur in both short-term and long-term studies. The short-term
reaction could result from the firms conveying revaluation information to the public.
Chang (1993) suggests that repurchases are a credible informational signal if managers
know more than investors and information is costly. The new information could indicate
that the firm has free cash flows and purchasing its own shares is a good investment, or
that the firm believes that its shares are undervalued and purchasing shares is a rational
investment in a positive net present value project.
Researchers have put forth arguments suggesting both that repurchases signal
undervaluation and also that repurchases are an appealing use of free cash flows.9 For
example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) justified announcement date
abnormal returns of 3.5 percent for open-market repurchase announcements to managers’

8

Dann, 1981; Dann, Masulis, and Mayers, 1991; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995;
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990, and Vermaelen 1981.Erwin and Miller, 1998, show that in addition to
positive stock price reactions for firms announcing repurchases, they also find negative stock price
reactions to rival firms.
9
Bagwell, 1991, presents another explanation by showing that an upward sloping demand curve exists.
Thus, when a firm repurchases its shares, given heterogeneous valuations, shareholders with the lowest
valuations will sell and the remaining shareholders will have higher valuations and the stock price must
increase.

8

claims to repurchase their stock because prevailing market prices are too low. Thus a
repurchase is a good investment.
The other hypothesis which explains positive stock price reactions is that a
repurchase is an agency mitigating, and thus effective use of free cash flows. Jensen
(1986) explains the problems of firm’s free cash flow as follows: It would be optimal if
managers owned 100 percent of the firm. However, due to the legal structure in the
United States we find that 50 percent of firms have very broad ownership. Jensen puts
forth the often-cited hypothesis that given separation of management and ownership there
will be agency costs. It is in the manager’s best interest, for example, to increase the
value of his or her personal options by influencing the current market price of the stock.
Obviously, this might also benefit the shareholders.
In addition to agency mitigating, firms that choose to repurchase their own stock
with free cash flows may be, in fact, choosing their best investment opportunity. The free
cash flow hypothesis would support the positive abnormal stock price reactions
empirically found at the announcement of a repurchase. Thus, repurchases are generally
considered a good use of free cash flow because the repurchase reduces cash, which in
turn reduces agency costs. On the other hand, Song (2002) argues that the open-market
repurchase is not a credible commitment because repurchase distributions are not
mandated by law and can occur at any time and by any method chosen by the manager.10

10

Currently the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) has few regulations regarding disclosures of
repurchase activities. In a nutshell, Securities and Exchange Commission release nos. 33-7881, 34-43154,
IC-24599, file no. S7-31-99 states that an issuer conducting a repurchase program need not specify the
amounts, prices, and dates that it will repurchase its securities; rather, the issuer can adopt a written plan
when it is not aware of material nonpublic information. On, December 10, 2002 the SEC issued a proposed
amendment to its 10b-18 rule regarding providing a “safe harbor” from liability for manipulation when a

9

Song (2002) 11 adds that United States corporate law does not mandate corporations to
pay out a certain level of cash distributions, and in fact managers have strong incentives
to avoid payouts. For example, managers are more risk-averse than shareholders because
it is difficult to diversify their own human capital. Thus, risk-averse managers have
strong incentive to hold extra money for unexpected future hard times. Song concludes
that managers have the opportunity to further their own interests, which, in turn, may
result in significant social costs that may offset any benefits of the repurchase.
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) suggest that the market would only view openmarket repurchases as credible if they were firm commitments. Companies choosing to
falsely signal must be forced to repurchase shares at prices above their true long-run
value in order for there to be a cost to false signaling. Ikenberry and Vermaelen question

firm repurchases its common stock in the market in accordance with the rule’s manner, timing, price, and
volume conditions. The SEC notes that an issuer may have the incentive to manipulate the price of its
securities and one way to positively affect the price is to purchase securities in the open market. This
amendment would require repurchase disclosures to Regulations S-K and S-B and Forms 10-Q, 10-QSB,
10-K, 10-ksB, and 20-F indicating the total number of shares purchased for the previous quarter, the
average price paid per share, the identity of the broker, the number of shares purchases as part of a publicly
announced plan and the maximum number of shares that may yet be purchased. The SEC is also proposing
footnote disclosure of the principal terms of publicly announced repurchase plans including 1) the date of
the announcement, 2) the share or dollar amount approved, 3) the expiration date (if any), 4) each plan that
has expired during the period, 5) each plan the issuer has determined to terminate prior to expiration, and 6)
each plan the issuer has not purchased under during the period. In fact, as long as firms follow the SEC
guidelines as set forth in SEC Rule 10b-18, firms will receive “safe harbor” protection from liability from
purchasing their own stock. The 10b-18 Rule (SEC file no. S7-50-02) applies to bids for and purchases of
an issuer’s common stock by or for an issuer. The safe harbor does not confer absolute protection from all
liability for purchases (e.g. purchases that are part of a plan or scheme to evade federal security laws) even
if made in technical compliance with the Rule. Rather the safe harbor provides only that certain, specific
provisions of the securities laws will not be considered to have been violated solely by reason of the
manner, timing, price, or volume of such repurchases, provided the repurchases are made within the
limitations of the Rule. The four conditions of the rule are 1) issuer to use a single broker or dealer per day
to bid or purchase its common stock; 2) issuer cannot bid for or purchase at the opening and during the last
half hour of trading during the day; 3) highest price bid or pay for must be set by independent market
forces; and 4) issuers may effect daily purchases up to 25 percent of the average daily volume. The Safe
Harbor is a guideline for corporations to follow to avoid being accused of fraudulent trading practices. The
guidelines are not mandatory.
11
Song, 2002, develops the theoretical rationale to argue for regulation in open-market repurchasing.

10

whether the news of an open-market repurchase program should be viewed as a credible
information signal and further suggest that the firm’s true intention is unknown.
Nohel and Tarhan (1998) investigate the motive for repurchase and suggest that it
is possible for different firms to repurchase for different reasons. For example, some
firms may signal a bright future (undervaluation), while others distribute excess cash.
Nohel and Tarhan look at operating performance changes to see if firms are undervalued
and are choosing to signal this information. If this were the case, Nohel and Tarhan
argue, we should find operating performance improvement relative to what was expected
and thus management would be signaling credible information. Specifically, Nohel and
Tarhan hypothesize that high-growth firms may use the repurchase to signal investment
opportunity, while low-growth firms may distribute cash instead. Sorting by Tobin’s q,
they unexpectedly find significant improvements in operating performance following the
repurchases from the low-growth firms. Nohel and Tarhan find repurchasers outperform
their matched-control firms by 23.3 percent for low q-firms but are significantly negative
for high-q firms. They also find that leverage increases after the repurchase, but the
results are driven by high-q sample of firms. They find that market-to-book values of low
q firms remain lower than their control group, and post-repurchase performance at low q
firms is correlated with assets sales, which supports the free cash flow hypothesis.
In another study, Evans and Gentry (1999) not only find little improvement but
actually find underperformance by repurchasing firms. They find that firms that do not
repurchase their shares create more long-run growth in value than firms that incorporate a
buyback strategy. Specifically, they find that small and mid-size non-repurchasing firms

11

outperform firms that repurchase their shares. Evans and Gentry attribute these results to
the productive net working capital and capital projects investments made by the nonrepurchasing firms. Contrary to other researchers, their findings do not support the theory
that share-repurchase programs are related to management signaling an increase in a
firm's long-run performance in the market, nor that a repurchase strategy signals that
shares are undervalued.

Type of Repurchase
D'Mello and Shroff (2000) show with an earning-based valuation model that 74
percent of firms announcing fixed-price tender offers were undervalued. This would
indicate that firms using a fixed-price tender offer are signaling a credible undervaluation
message. Thus, it appears that managers can credibly convey their perceived dollar
amount of stock undervaluation by the type of repurchase offer they choose. Traditional
fixed-price tender offers specify a single purchase price in advance, a number of shares
sought, and an expiration date. Dutch-auction offers also specify a number of shares
sought but at a range of prices within which each tendering shareholder chooses his or
her minimum acceptable selling price. Generally, because the Dutch auction allows the
managers to obtain a relatively low (minimum) offer price, it follows that Dutch auctions
should provide a weaker signal of market price undervaluation than an otherwise
equivalent fixed-price tender offer; that is, Dutch auction offers with low minimum offer
prices should not be as convincing a signal of undervaluation as a fixed-price tender
offer. Comment and Jarrell (1991), in their study with 1984-1989 data, find average
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excess returns of 11 percent at the announcement date with fixed-price tender offers and
8 percent for Dutch auctions. Furthermore, they find that open-market repurchase
announcements are met with only two percent average excess return. Comment and
Jarrell’s results support the signaling hypothesis. Firms that send the strongest signal by
attaching a clear premium are met with the greatest event-day stock price reaction.
Li and McNally (1999) employ a conditional study framework to determine the
characteristics of firms choosing to make tender offers over those making open-market
repurchase offers. They find that tender offering firms have higher cash flows, higher
dividend yields, poorer investment opportunities, greater volatility of returns and larger
insider share holdings. Li and McNally note that this is consistent with large shareholders
having the ability to mitigate agency problems of financial slack. They conclude that
firms exhibit comparative advantage in their choice of repurchase method.
Gay, Kale and Noe (1996) present a theoretical argument of the advantages of
Dutch-auction repurchases over that of fixed-price tender offers. They confirm the
intuitive argument that firms pay more than is needed to buy back the desired number of
shares when conducting a fixed-price tender offer due to over-subscriptions. The authors
suggest that if firms use a fixed-price offer, then there will be an excessive wealth
transfer from remaining shareholders to exiting shareholders. This raises the question as
to whether there are repurchase situations where the firm pays back too much for its
stock.
In another study, Hodrick (1999) finds that the firms that will face greater stock
price elasticity are more likely to choose a Dutch-auction repurchase offer over a fixed-
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price tender offer. Other characteristics of the Dutch-auction choosing firms noted by
Hodrick are that they have larger market capitalizations, smaller insider holdings, larger
institutional holdings, lower trading volume and tend to repurchase fewer shares during
the repurchase program.
The most common type of repurchase is accomplished through open-market
repurchases where a firm announcing the open-market repurchase provides no
commitment to carry out its announced repurchase intentions. The firm can buy back as
many, or as few, shares as desired over a period of time at varying current market prices.
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that between 46 percent and 75 percent of
firms complete their repurchase plans within one year and 74 percent and 82 percent of
shares of all firms in the sample are actually acquired.12 Their study finds share
repurchases are negatively related to prior stock-price performance and positively related
to levels of cash flow. Stephens and Weisbach suggest that firms purchase the stock when
it is undervalued and defer when it is overvalued and thus firms choose open-market
repurchases over Dutch-auction or self-tender because of the flexibility in magnitude
repurchased and the timing of the repurchase.13 In an out-of-sample test, Ikenberry,
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) studied Canadian firms. Canadian firms are required
to report each month the number of shares they actually repurchase. Surprisingly,

12

Altobelli and Wiggins, 1998, that on average firms repurchase more shares than originally authorized and
conclude that the open-market repurchase announcement is a credible signal. They also find that firms
actively issue shares while repurchasing so that the average decrease in shares outstanding is only about
20% of the number repurchased.
13
Cook, Krigman, and Leach, 2001, find that while there is considerable variation across firms, NYSE
firms under-going open-market repurchase activities on average beat their benchmark whereas Nasdaq
firms do not. This suggests that NYSE firms are able to plan the timing of their open-market transactions to
their advantage.
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Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen find that about 25 percent of firms never purchase
any of their shares and less than 5 percent of firms fully complete their repurchase
programs (overall the mean completion rate is 28.6 percent).
If firms use repurchases to signal undervaluation then why do we not see more
firms using fixed-price and Dutch-auction arrangements, since these two methods should
provide a stronger signal of undervaluation? Furthermore, Song (2002) suggests that
open-market repurchases are not credible commitments since the offers can be canceled
anytime without legal or market punishment. Thus, there is no cost to the insiders and if
there are no costs, such announcements cannot be viewed as a signal. However, in spite
of the weak and questionable signal, we find the predominant structure of a repurchase
accomplished through open-market repurchases (see Table 1). Firms choose to conduct
an open-market repurchase six times as frequently as fixed-price self-tender and Dutchauctions combined. Comment and Jarrell (1991) predict that fixed-price self-tender offers
should be the strongest signal of firm undervaluation followed by Dutch-auction. The
weakest signal should come from open-market repurchases because they have no
attached premium.
It is possible that each type of repurchase implies a different message. Persons
(1994) presents a repurchase choice model. He finds that Dutch-auction repurchases are
more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed-price repurchases are more effective
signals of undervaluation. Persons’ research sheds light on why firms choose between
Dutch-auction and fixed-price tender offers, but does not help to explain why the open-
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market procedure has become the preferred method of cash disbursement to
shareholders.14

Management Compensation and Options
In addition to reducing free cash flows through repurchases, increasing debt
obligations, or increasing firm’s leverage or risk levels in order to mitigate agency
problems, a firm can tie manager’s compensation to performance.15 Almost a decade ago,
shareholders, led by institutional investors, pressured corporate boards and executives to
tie managers’ compensation to performance. Under this “pay for performance” ideal,
many companies began aggressive stock option plans for managers and employees.
Awarding stock options to employees and executives not only tied pay to performance
but was also perceived to mitigate the principal-agent problem. Thus, while repurchases
increased during the 1990s, there was an increasing reliance on stock options to
compensate top managers.16

14

Although open-market transactions are conducted six times as frequently as fixed-price tender-offers and
Dutch-auction combined, the market value of the repurchase is considerably less. The total market value of
open-market repurchases from 1984-2001 is one-third the market value of the other two methods
combined.
15
Mehran, 1992, investigates the firm’s capital structure with management’s incentive plans,
management’s equity ownership and several monitoring proxies, and finds results consistent with agency
theory.
16
Top 200 US companies allocated a record 15.2% of their shares to employee stock options as a percent of
shares outstanding in 2000, compared to 7.5% in 1990 (Yang and Carlton 2002). Also executive equity
holdings account for nearly 70% of CEO compensation and most of the shares are the result from the
exercise of their stock options (Pearl Meyer & Partners, an executive compensation consulting firm). Also
Bowen, 1996, reports in the Wall Street Journal that the 200 largest companies reserved more than ten
percent of their common shares to be awarded to managers, which is an increase from six percent six years
earlier.
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Employees arguably have some informational advantage and there is, most likely,
value in fortuitous timing of option grants and exercises.17 Yermack (1997) finds that
managers receive stock-option grants shortly before good news announcements regarding
earnings, and delay such grants until after bad news announcements. Yermack suggests
that options are not so much an incentive device but rather a covert mechanism for selfdealing. On the other side, compensation-based options do have a few value decreasing
differences, including vesting restrictions and compensation based options that are nontransferable. Employees also tend to exercise options early (American options) leaving
some value unrealized.
Stock options can encourage managers to choose repurchases over conventional
dividend payments because repurchases, unlike dividends, do not reduce the per-share
value of the stock. Jolls (1998) finds that firms that relied heavily on stock-option based
compensation are significantly more likely to repurchase their stock than firms that do
not. Furthermore, Jolls and others attribute the growth in open-market repurchases to the
increase in option grants.18
The granting of options to both managers of firms and employees has been lauded
as a sound performance-based compensation plan for firms.19 Employees, managers,
board members and sometimes consultants have been granted stock options, usually at
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See Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976, for discussion on imperfect information.
Arnold and Gillenkirch, 2002; Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, 2002; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Grullon
and Michaely, 2002 and 2003; and Kahle, 2002.
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Contrary to the argument that pay should be tied to performance, Elayan, Lau, and Meyer, 2001, find that
companies which adopt incentive compensation schemes do not outperform companies without incentive
compensation schemes.
18
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the current market price.20 The general argument for pay-for-performance is that
managers and employees will work harder if a portion of their pay is incentive-based.
The goal for employees is to profit from in-the-money options, which is likely to occur
when stock prices are high. Companies presumably will pay smaller salaries and cash
bonuses when options are substituted for direct compensation. Shareholders should
benefit in this alignment of interest to increase the value of the firm. In an ideal world, as
the firm’s stock price increases, employees and managers receive higher compensation as
their options move in-the-money. Shareholders also benefit as the value of their shares
increases.21
Contrary evidence has been provided by Yermack (1995) in his investigation of
why companies award stock options to their top managers.22 He tests nine agency and
financial contracting theories using Tobit and panel data analysis and finds little
explanatory power with any of these prevailing theories. Specifically, Yermack finds
companies do not provide incentives from stock option awards in any significant
association with the fraction of equity owned by the CEO. He also finds a negative
association between incentives provided by stock options and the presence of growth
opportunities which is counter to many other studies that suggest that firms with growth
opportunities provide higher levels of CEO compensation. Furthermore, Yermack finds
20

According to generally accepted accounting standards firms only report the difference of option grant
over the current market price as an expense during the year granted. As long as companies issue options at
market price or out of the money, no expense needs to be recorded. Thus firms generally choose to issue at
market.
21
David Aboody, 1996, analyzes the value of employee stock options (ESO) and finds ESOs to be
negatively correlated with the firm’s stock prices. In early option vesting years there is a positive effect on
firm value, but vested options are considered a net cost to the firm’s shareholders.
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no significant association between financial leverage and incentives from stock option
awards despite prediction from John and John (1993). Thus, although pay for
performance has been argued to be the optimal compensation structure, it appears that
there is a general absence of management incentives in CEO compensation packages.
Interestingly, during most of the 1990s bull market, executives received huge
compensation packages in the form of options even when their companies lagged behind
stock market averages, reports the Wall Street Journal.23 Executives and employees were
happy and investors were satisfied as long as the stock prices continued to increase.
Unfortunately, there is no clear evidence that options generate better performance of a
firm’s earnings, suggests the Wall Street Journal. Also, it appears that executive behavior
changed in other less productive ways during that period, adds the Journal.24 Thus,
although the argument for performance-based compensation is sound, the performance
measure may need adjustment (for example, tied to an index) in order that the
compensation costs do not outweigh their benefits (Gillan (2001)) and to force the firm to
conduct ongoing repurchases to meet the option exercise demand.
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Blasi, Kruse, and Berstein, 2003, argue that options can be effective only if they are granted to all
employees and not just the top managers.
23
Lee, Susan, 2002, The Ugly Option, Wall Street Journal (New York).
24
One less productive management action has been the repricing of options. A consequence of later falling
stock market prices was to make many employee and executive stock options essentially worthless, or to
have been pulled “underwater”. This means that the exercise price of the options has fallen below the
current market price of the underlying security. Many employees had accepted compensation packages that
included less salary, in hopes of large option payoffs. As the stock prices dived and the employees lost
compensation, many may have chosen to relocate to another firm where they could receive an option
package with a low exercise price at the new firm and ultimately a higher probability of realizing a gain.
Managers of firms were thus under pressure to reprice the options in order to keep talented employees.
Repricing options is a process of canceling existing outstanding options and reissuing at a lower strike
price. Jin and Meulbroek, 2001, find that underwater options remain effective and conclude that restoring
incentive alignment is not a sufficient reason for repricing options.
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Kahle (2002) examines how stock options may have affected the firm’s decision
to repurchase shares and finds that firms announce repurchases when executives have
large numbers of options outstanding. So, during the 1990s as executive compensation
increased in the form of options25 firms repurchased their stock at increasing prices.
Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong (2002) substantiate this by finding that managers do
repurchase shares to avoid the dilutive effects of employee stock option plans.
Furthermore, the authors add that since repurchases involve paying out cash, thus
reducing the future dollar return on that cash, the repurchase will ultimately result in
reducing future earnings per share by reducing earnings. Thus, the original argument of
initiating a repurchase to counteract dilution to presumably increase or at least maintain
earnings per share may, in fact, in the long run decrease earnings per share. This is
substantiated by Fenn and Liang (1998), who find negative relationships between their
proxies for investment opportunity and marginal financing costs and repurchases. Lie and
McConnell (1998) state that when firms repurchase shares to avoid dilution relating to
option exercise there is a wealth transfer from shareholders to employees, since the cost
of repurchase is much higher than the price at which employees exercise their options.
Klassen and Sivakumar (2001) argue that when repurchases are conducted because
managers believe their stock to be undervalued, then positive information is conveyed to
the market. A repurchase to reduce dilutive effects does not convey new information
about future firm performance and on one hand should be irrelevant. In this case we
should not see any abnormal return reactions with a repurchase announcement to
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Der Howanesian, Mara, 2002, The Buyback Boomerang, Businessweek.
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counteract dilution. However, repurchasing shares does not effectively reduce economic
dilution because the firm gives up a portion of its assets to repurchase. Thus,
repurchasing to avoid dilution may have the negative effect of passing up better
investment opportunities. For these reasons, I suggest that repurchasing shares to
counteract dilution should not result in positive stock price returns reactions and may, in
fact, be negative, especially in the long run when the results of foregoing investment
opportunities are realized.
Klassen and Sivakumar (2001) note that the funding of stock option programs by
repurchasing shares is an expensive strategy and suggest that option exercise could
represent a real cost to the firm as a wealth transfer from shareholder to employee. The
Economist (1/27/01) reports a study by Smithers and Co. that documents that if options
had been accounted for at the time they were granted, the profits of large-listed
companies in 1998 would have been two-thirds lower. Klassen and Sivakumar note that
repurchases increased from 1995-1999 when stock prices were soaring and then dropped
during 2000. This implies firms were conducting buybacks as prices were increasing and
stopped when their stocks became cheap. This is in contradiction to the often-cited
undervaluation hypothesis.
Yermack (1997) finds that managers receive stock option grants shortly before
good news announcements and delay such grants until after bad news announcements.
Yermack suggests that options are not so much an incentive device, but rather a covert
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mechanism for self-dealing.26 Other researchers have suggested that managers behave
opportunistically at the expense of shareholders. For example, Healy (1995) finds that
firms are more likely to accrue discretionary expenses during years in which their
operating income exceeds the upper limits or falls below lower limits of managers'
accounting-based bonus plans. In another study, Jolls (1998) finds that option
compensated managers substitute stock repurchases for dividend payments because
managers normally do not share in dividends paid by the firm.
Fenn and Liang (1998) study whether firms substitute repurchases for dividends
when management options are at stake. They find that share repurchases are positively
related to management stock options and dividend increases are negatively related for the
dividend-paying firms. Furthermore, Fenn and Liang found no statistical relationship
between repurchases and management options for the non-dividend paying firms. In a
similar vein, Lambert, Lanen and Larcher (1989) find that firms pay lower dividends
after the adoption of stock option plans.
Liang and Sharpe (1999) study S&P 500 firms to establish the effects of firms that
repurchase and exercise stock options. They find, in a 1994-1998 sample of S&P 500
firms, gross repurchases reduced shares outstanding two percent annually; however,
owing to the exercise of employee stock options, only about half of those shares were

26

Specifically, Yermack, 1997, finds that the average abnormal stock return to the CEO is $30,000 after 20
trading days and $48,900 after 50 days. As an aside, options are awarded once a year by a compensation
committee of the board acting under the authority of periodic shareholder votes. The options details are
only disclosed in annual proxy statements, which could be as much as 15 months after the grant.
Shareholder votes usually occur once every five years and Yermack, 1997, reports that as of his paper a
NYSE's proxy expert had no knowledge of one ever being rejected.
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actually retired. According to Liang and Sharpe, when firms repurchase shares to avoid
dilution relating to option exercise, there is a wealth transfer from shareholders to
employees since the cost of repurchasing is higher than the employee exercise price. This
would increase employee compensation and reduce the firm’s future net income, thus
decreasing earnings per share available to the stockholder. As an aside, a firm that
chooses to issue new shares to facilitate option exercise would also experience a decrease
in earnings per share due to the increase in number of shares rather than the decrease to
earnings.
In a September 2002 Business Week article, Der Howanesian (2002) suggests that
stock repurchases can enrich executives’ compensation at investors’ expense. During the
1990s, cash rich firms purchased their stock at record high prices. Historically, buybacks
were supposed to be a good use of free cash flow and, as such, repurchasing activity
made sense when a firm’s stock price was depressed, such as the period following the
October 1987 crash. But, did it make sense during the earlier 1990s when stock prices
were booming?
Thus, are buybacks simply a way for corporate executives to maximize their own
wealth, as Business Week suggests? Since it is well-known that repurchase
announcements are met with positive stock price return reactions, can executives boost
the price in the short-term and then sell their shares at a profit? This would have the
effect of transferring wealth from the shareholder or owners of the firm to the executives.
If this is the case, shouldn’t open-market repurchase announcements be met with possibly
a negative, or at least non-positive, stock price return reaction?

23

Repurchases and Managerial Ownership
Researchers have suggested that the agency problem between owners and
managers can be mitigated if the managers have equity ownership. Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1990) examine inside directors’ appointments and find that stock market
reactions depend upon director ownership levels. Specifically, they find negative
reactions when inside directors own less than five percent of the firm’s common stock,
significantly positive when their ownership level is between five percent and 25 percent,
and insignificantly different from zero when ownership exceeds 25 percent. Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny attribute this to the alignment of interests in the middle ownership
range, but costs of entrenchment outweighing the benefits of alignment of interests at
high levels of ownership. Thus, it appears agency issues may be mitigated when
managers own between five and 25 percent of the company’s stock. At ownership levels
of less than five percent, agency issues are a valid concern.
McConnell and Servaes (1995) separate a large sample into high growth and low
growth firms and investigate Tobin’s q, debt, and equity ownership and find that firms
with low (high) investment opportunity that q is positively (negatively) related to debt.
McConnell and Servaes regress q with equity ownership and find some support that
equity ownership is more important in low growth firms. This follows the Jensen (1986)
argument that firms with poor investment opportunities are more likely to overinvest in
negative net present value projects if free cash flow is available. Concluding, many other
researchers have investigated the relationship between corporate value and the allocation
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of shares among corporate insiders and while results differ there is a consensus that
allocation of equity ownership matters.27
Hubbard and Palia (1996) propose the diversification-control hypothesis to
address the impact of managers’ private benefits of control as it relates to the bid
premium paid in a merger. They develop a model and empirically show that 1) managers
will indulge in non value-maximizing activities and will overpay the merger premium
when the managers have a low ownership stake; 2) managers’ and owners’ interest are
aligned as the ownership stake is increased and there is a negative relationship between
the bid premium and managerial ownership; and 3) at significantly high ownership levels
managers are again willing to pay high premiums due to private benefits of control. This
gives rise to a non-monotonic relationship of first increasing (alignment of interest and
value-maximizing behavior) and then decreasing as also shown by Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1990).
Ofek and Yermack (1997) argue that although boards intend for stock options to
boost the ownership positions of managers, there is no assurance that executive will
behave accordingly. For example, modern portfolio theory suggests that managers
receiving additional stock should sell those shares or shares they already own in order to
diversify away the unsystematic risk associated with concentrating wealth in a single
asset. Furthermore, this risk is higher for managers than ordinary investors because of
their human capital investment. Ofek and Yermack find that executives sell stock during
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For example see Holderness and Sheehan, 1988, and Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, See also Lewellen,
Loderer, and Rosenfeld, 1985, who find that returns to acquiring firms are positively correlated with the
equity stake of the acquirer's top managers or low management ownership is associated with low returns.
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years that they receive new options. Although consistent with modern portfolio theory,
selling already owned shares counteracts the board’s objectives. Specifically they find
that, on average, executives will sell 180 shares of stock for every 1000 new stock
options awarded. Additionally, executives retain virtually none of the shares they acquire
with the exercise of the options
Thus, it appears that the granting of options may not have the intended purpose of
aligning managers’ and stockholder’ objectives. Although option granting may not be the
optimal method of turning managers into owners, we do know that ownership matters..28
In the spirit of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and of Raad and Wu (1994), I expect
that the repurchase announcement should be positive for firms with high free cash flows,
for it should align managerial and stockholders interests. However, if a firm has low
managerial ownership and high free cash flows a repurchase could either help control the
potential agency issues (good use of free cash flows) or it could be that the manager with
significant options has the incentive to manipulate the firm’s stock price with a
repurchase announcement.
Another group which may have the incentive to manipulate and also the means to
manipulate would be firms with high managerial ownership (entrenched managers) and
high free cash flow. This group may be able to manipulate the firm’s stock price in the
short-run but may do poorly in the long-term.
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Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; and Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997
Contrary to these and other researchers, Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999, use panel data to show that
we cannot conclude that a firm’s performance is effected by managerial ownership.
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At the other extreme are firms with high managerial ownership and low free cash
flows. Firms with these characteristics should not be susceptible to agency problems and
thus should not require stock options to align shareholder and manager incentives.29 In
these firms the stock option grant may be an unnecessary and expensive compensation
package. Furthermore, we may find the repurchase announcement to be non-positive
because options may serve to exacerbate the entrenchment problem.
I have made a theoretical argument that ownership matters and different levels of
managerial stock ownership and levels of option grants can provide different managerial
incentives. However, I still may not be able to disentangle the opportunistic behavior of
managers. In other words, a self-serving manager who manipulates the price of the firms
stock with an increase in market price is not necessarily acting against shareholders
interests. In this case, it would be possible for everyone to gain.
In reference to payouts and ownership stakes, Fenn and Liang (2001) show that
the highest firm payouts (dividends and repurchases) occur in firms that are more likely
to have agency problems (for example, low executive ownership and high free cash
flows). Jolls (1998) shows that the growth in repurchases is tied to the increase in options
granted. It would appear that the firms that should derive the most benefit for granting
options would be the firms with the greatest potential for agency problems. This would
support significantly positive stock price reactions of firms announcing repurchase offers
to cover options if the firm also had low managerial ownership and high free cash flows.
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Although, these managers may not require options for agency mitigating problems, they may require
options for what may be considered fair compensation in their industry.
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Stock option grants may not depress current earnings directly; however, they will
reduce future earnings. If a firm does not repurchase any shares, stock options will have a
dilutive effect upon subsequent earnings per share. When a firm repurchases its stock, it
reduces the number of shares over which earnings are divided. The cash used to finance
the repurchase will reduce paid-in-capital, but will not directly affect earnings. Thus,
some firms may have the incentive to combine on-going share repurchase programs with
option programs to undo the erosion to earnings per share. Stock option grants should
align shareholder objectives with firm managers’ objectives. However, there must be a
trade-off between the benefit of aligning incentives and the cost of implementing or
paying for the options as they become due. For this trade-off reason, I expect to have a
positive correlation between some lower level of option granting as incentives are aligned
and compensation costs are not too high and a negative correlation at some higher level
of option granting as the costs of the grants outweigh the alignment benefit. As an
example of a high level of option granting, Barron’s Online reports that Lehman Brothers
issued 26 million options in 200230.
In summary, there have been numerous studies surrounding repurchase
announcements and the effects on firm performance and stock price reactions. Although
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Barron’s Online reports that, “The Street's most lavish options issuer continues to be Lehman Brothers.
In 2002, it issued 26 million options, fully 10% of its shares outstanding, up from 21 million in the prior
year. Lehman's reported compensation last year was 51% of revenues, but if the effective value of the
options is factored in, that cost rises to almost 60% -- a large wealth transfer from public shareholders to
Lehman employees that isn't captured in the company's income statement. Lehman spent heavily on share
repurchases last year to offset its lavish option grants, acquiring $1.5 billion of stock, more than its $1
billion of net income”.
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some studies have suggested a downside to repurchasing activity,31 I am not aware of a
study that attempts to disentangle the repurchase announcement to distinguish between
the purposes of the repurchase announcement. My study will attempt to make this
distinction by sub-sampling stock repurchase announcements as specified in the
following sections.

Prediction, Data and Methodology
Hypotheses
Most research conducted on the repurchase announcement event finds that stock
price returns are significantly positive on the event date and positive stock returns
continue to persist for up to four years post the event date. These results are documented
without questioning the motivation or the purpose of the repurchase. This research
examines the purpose of the repurchase and I question whether a repurchase
announcement is always viewed as “good news” and be met with significantly positive
stock price reactions.
Indeed, there are possibly opportunistic reasons for firms to repurchase their own
stock. Firms may repurchase their own stock to fund an acquisition, to counteract dilution
effects and to cover options. In very basic terms, when a firm grants options it will
ultimately either have to increase its number of shares, which will reduce earnings per
share, or it can avoid this potential earnings dilution by both granting options and
repurchasing its shares. On the one hand, if option granting really does mitigate agency
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Kahle, 2002; Yermack, 1997; and Evans and Gentry, 1999.
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problems between the owners and managers of the firm and if repurchasing shares also
has the desired effect to mitigate earnings dilution, then both activities could be positive
news. On the other hand, it can be questioned whether repurchasing to counteract dilution
is nothing more than an earning scheme by management. Thus, repurchasing to
counteract dilution may maintain a constant number of shares outstanding (denominator
in earning per share); however, earnings may be reduced (numerator) resulting in reduced
earnings per share. Thus, when employee stock options are granted the value of the
existing owners’ stake in the firm is reduced.
For these reasons, I do not think that a repurchase announcement should always
be good news. Specifically, there are situations such as the funding of an acquisition, the
covering of employee options, and the counteracting of dilution issues, that should not
necessarily be met with as positive stock price reactions as those signaling undervaluation
or enhancing stockholder value.

Hypothesis 1
The abnormal return will be less-positive or non-positive for firms announcing
repurchases for opportunistic reasons such as non-value-enhancing acquisitions,
counteracting dilution effects, and covering options as compared to the
cumulative abnormal returns for all other repurchase motives.
I have hypothesized that the return for some repurchasing activities will be less
positive or perhaps non-positive. It is possible that this may not be immediately
recognized or even distinguishable in the short run. Although the manager of a firm may
be acting opportunistically, that does not necessarily preclude that his or her actions are
aligned with the interests of shareholders. In other words, if no difference in the stock
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price reactions of different types of repurchase objectives are observed at the
announcement date, it may be that these types of repurchases are still consistent with
either the free cash flow hypothesis or the undervaluation hypothesis and distinguishing
them may be an arduous task.
Many researchers have shown the persistence in positive abnormal returns
following stock repurchase announcements. This is a puzzle in that if a repurchase signals
undervaluation or is an appropriate use of free cash flow, then positive announcement day
reactions may be expected, but the reactions should not persist three- to four-years post
event.32 Furthermore, if the repurchases are conducted for opportunistic objectives, we
should not see positive long-term abnormal returns.
Hypothesis 2
The abnormal long-run returns will be less positive or non-positive for firms
announcing repurchases for opportunistic reasons such as an acquisition,
counteracting dilution effects, and the covering of options as compared to the
cumulative abnormal returns for all other repurchase motives.

A lack of results or mixed results from hypotheses one and two could suggest that
all repurchases on average are good news and positive stock price reactions should be
anticipated. However, if that were the case firms should announce repurchases even more
frequently than they do, for there is no cost associated with a false signal.33 Another
possibility is that opportunistic repurchases do exist but their existence is dependent upon
32

Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995.
Jagannathan and Stephens, 2001, find that the market reactions to frequent vs. infrequent repurchase
announcements are consistent with undervaluation. Infrequent repurchasers have lower market-to-book
ratios suggesting that they are more likely to be undervalued, are preceded by negative abnormal returns,
and are on average greeted with a stronger stock price return reaction than the frequent repurchasers. Thus,
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managers’ ownership levels and whether or not managers and shareholders have similar
goals.
I suggest a positive relationship at low-option levels and a negative relationship at
high-option levels. This is similar in spirit to the work by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997)
noted earlier. However, in their paper the costs are due to entrenchment, whereas in this
paper I am suggesting a wealth transfer.
As a general clarification, compensation-based options are different from
exchange-traded options. One value-enhancing feature to the compensation-based option
is its longer maturity date (five years may be typical). Thus, the value of options
outstanding can be substantial. The number of options outstanding at the end of year is
disclosed on firms’ proxy statements (since 1992); however, balance sheets do not
include an allowance for this liability.
In summary, I plan to test my hypothesis using standard event study methodology
using the constant mean return and the market model to measure abnormal returns with
the announcement of the repurchase. I plan to control the test with free cash flow
variables, ownership variables, executive option levels, growth variables, firm size and
the frequency of the repurchases by a firm.

Sample
The sample of repurchases is collected from Securities Data Corporation’s
Mergers and Acquisitions database and Repurchases database. I begin by collecting all

although the market generally views all repurchases favorably frequent repurchasers are greeted less
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open-market, Dutch-auction, and fixed-price self-tender offers with original
announcement dates between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 2002. The Repurchases
database began data accumulation with 1994 repurchases. My sample of repurchase firms
dating from 1994 through 2002 was collected from this database. Prior to 1994,
repurchases were obtained from the Mergers and Acquisition database. I found a firm
choosing to repurchase its shares to be any firm which made an acquisition of its same
cusip number. Thus, any firm with the same cusip number for the acquirer and the target
firm is considered to have made a repurchase. The Securities Data Corporation database
includes all corporate transactions involving at least five percent of the ownership of a
company where the transaction was valued at $1 million or more (after 1992, deals of any
value are covered) or where the value of the transaction was undisclosed. Financial firms
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4910-4949) were removed
because they are believed to face a different incentive structure around repurchase
activity. Imposing these restrictions results in an initial sample of 3999 firm repurchase
announcements including 177 Dutch-auction, 373 fixed-price tender offers and 3,449
open-market repurchases. Table 2-1 shows descriptive statics for my sample repurchase
firms.
Along with repurchase announcements and the type of repurchase conducted, I
have also obtained several more variables from the Securities Data Corporation’s
Repurchase database which have been available since 1995.34 These variables include a

enthusiastically.
34
I use the sample dating from 1988 to show the frequency of open-market repurchases, Dutch-auction and
fixed-price tender offers. However, all empirical analysis is conducted with repurchases initiated between
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purchase code, SIC codes, and the total shares repurchased in number, dollar value or as a
percent of the common shares outstanding. The purpose codes indicate a firm-reported
description of the reason why the repurchase was conducted. The codes are to support an
acquisition, to avoid dilution of earnings per share, to support an employee benefit plan,
to enhance shareholder value, to support a stock option plan and to signal undervaluation.
These codes will determine the motivation and the effect of the different repurchase
announcements.
I sub-divided my repurchase sample into four levels of executive stock option
value (zero value of exercisable options, low value (option value is less than 20 percent
of the executive’s salary and bonus) medium value (value of exercisable options is
between 20 and 150 percent of the executive’s salary and bonus); and a high option level
(value of exercisable options is greater than 150 percent of the executive’s salary and
bonus)). Slightly over 60 percent of my sample of firms granted zero options and thus I
placed those firms in one group. The low, medium, and high option levels were
established by placing one-third of the remaining firms in each group. The stated
percentile of options granted levels are simply the way the groups fell from this
arrangement. The option data is obtained from the Standards and Poor’s ExecuComp
database. This database contains information on executive compensation and ownership
for the S&P 1500 companies (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Smallcap 600
indices), beginning in 1992. Using this database, I can calculate the total number of

1995 and 2002. Thus, all statistical testing is conducted with the sample collected through Securities Data
Corporation’s Repurchase database.
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options held by top executives, the number of exercisable and unexercisable options held
by top executives, and the shares owned by the same executives.
In addition to my hypothesis variables, I include several control variables. Table
2-2 shows both control and hypothesis variables and the expected sign of their estimated
coefficients. Table 2-3 explains the definitions of the variables used in table 2-2 along
with theoretical justifications for the predicted signs.

Methodology
The research design to test my hypotheses uses a market model using both
ordinary least squares and Scholes-Williams beta estimation and constant mean return
model to calculate abnormal returns. I use daily data and my periods of interest are the
pre-event window (-30, +2), the announcement window (-1, +1) and post-event periods
of (+2, +30), two-years and three-years after the announcement.35

Market model and constant mean return model
I use event-study methodology using the constant mean return model and the
market model estimated by both ordinary least square and the method of Scholes and
Williams (1977) to measure abnormal returns (see Thompson (1995))36 The market
model abnormal returns are defined as Ajt = Rjt – (αj + βjRmt) where Ajt is the abnormal
return (or prediction error) for the common stock of the jth firm on day t, Rjt is the rate of
35

I conduct both a t-test and a z-test statistic to make inference about the significance of my results. Both of
these test statistics are calculate with Eventus software (see appendix A)
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return of the common stock of the jth firm on day t, αj and is the ordinary least squares
estimate of α, βj is a parameter that measures the sensitivity of Rjt to the market index
Rmt. The least squares estimation period ends 46 days before the event date and is 255
days in length. The equally-weighted and value-weighted market indexes are both used as
benchmarks in my study. The average abnormal return AARt is the sample mean. The
cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as CART1T2 = (1/N) ΣΣ Ajt. In earlier drafts I
also calculated buy-and-hold abnormal returns by compounding successive daily
returns.37 However, this produced problematic results with questionable biases and thus
those results have been omitted.38 I will show cumulative average abnormal returns for a
pre-announcement period (-30, -2), event-day (-1, +1), and three post-event periods (+2,
+30), (+31, two-years), (+31, three-years).
I will also use the market model with the Scholes-Williams beta estimation. The
beta estimator is βj = (βj bar + βj + βj+) / (1 + 2ρm) where βj bar is the ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimate from the regression of Rjt on Rmt-1, βj is the OLS estimate form
the regression of Rjt on Rmt+1, and ρm is the estimated first-order autocorrelation of Rm.
The market adjusted returns are simply the difference between the actual return
and the return of the market or Ajt = Rjt – Rmt. The definitions of the average and
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Thompson presents an excellent discussion of empirical methods of event studies in chapter 29 of
Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 9. The chapter cites numerous
studies and provides details of the empirical methodology that I will follow.
37
The buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated with the BUYHOLD command in eventus. Eventus
computes buy-and-hold abnormal returns by compounding successive daily raw returns and market index
returns, then adjusts the raw returns according to the abnormal return method used. The calculation for the
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buy-and-hold abnormal return follows:
See Canina, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1998 for a complete discussion.
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cumulative average abnormal returns follow those for the market model abnormal
returns. The abnormal returns are calculated with Eventus software.

Cross-sectional model
Theoretical models often suggest that there should be an association between the
magnitude of abnormal returns and characteristics to the event observation. To
investigate this, I will use a cross sectional regression of abnormal returns on
characteristics, where Y, the dependent variable, is the observed CAR and X, the
independent variables, are a matrix of characteristics. My X variables are shown in table
2 with their predicted signs. The general regression equation is that the announcement
day excess return = α + βj (characteristics). The cross-sectional model will be carried out
through SAS. This requires separate regressions for each year. The general regression
equation:
CARit = α1 + ΣγKTKi + α2 D2i + α3 D3i + φL PLi + β2 X2i + μit
Where TK = time series dummies from 1988 through 2002
D2i = 1 if Dutch-auction, 0 otherwise
D3i = 1 if fixed-price, 0 otherwise
PLi = purpose codes (ULV, DIL, ACQ, ESV, EBP, STP)
X = all other firm characteristics (table 2)
Market-to-book asset ratios also serve as a proxy for investment opportunities
(see e.g. Opler and Titman (1993)). All else being equal, higher market values suggest
that the firm is not undervalued and, in fact, would make the repurchase of shares a more
expensive undertaking. Thus, a high market-to-book (often referred to as a glamour
stock) would suggest a negative correlation with repurchases. Alternatively, a low bookto-market would predict a positive correlation with repurchases.
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Repurchases may also be the choice cash distribution for temporary cash flow
availability and not a permanent cash flow increase that would be more appropriately
signaled by a dividend increase.39 Thus, if a firm chooses to repurchase rather than
increase dividends, it may indicate only a temporary cash flow increase and not the more
desirable permanent cash flow increase. Previous research has used debt/assets, book-tomarket, net operating cash flow/assets and payout ratios (common dividends/net income)
as controls. I will also include these controls.
High debt levels may make managers more reluctant to distribute current cash
flows. As leverage increases, the probability of financial distress and hence external
financing costs increases. Reducing debt is an alternative use of disgorging free cash
flow;40 thus firms that rely more on debt will be less likely to repurchase. I will control
for this with the long-term debt to assets variable.
Firms with high levels of free cash flow are at a greater risk of overinvesting and
hence derive greater benefits from repurchasing their own stock. Also, firms with
relatively low marginal financing costs can distribute more cash to shareholders knowing
that if they must raise external funds in the future they will be able to do so relatively
inexpensively. I include size as a proxy for financing costs and information asymmetry. I
also include year indicator variables to control for exogenous differences in repurchases
that occur over the sample period. I also control for the frequency of the repurchase
announcement.41
39

Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 1998; Guay and Harford, 1999; and Gelb, 2000.
Jensen, 1986, and Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997.
41
Jagannathan, Murali, and Clifford P. Stephens, 2003, Motives For Multiple Open-Market Repurchase
Programs, Financial Management 32, 71-91. find frequent repurchasers to be much larger, have
40
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Announcing a repurchase to signal firm undervaluation conveys good news to the
market. If undervaluation is the message being conveyed, managers can clearly signal
this with the premium offered. I have included this distinction by the type of repurchase
offered.42
I expect all of the free cash flow control variables and the variables that suggest
that the firm is undervalued to have positive estimated coefficients. If the underlying
reason for the firm to make the repurchase decision is value-enhancing, it should be met
with positive stock price reactions. This would be consistent with past research studies.43
I include these variables to show both consistency with other research and as control
variables to help distinguish between good news and no news or bad news repurchase
announcements.
Firms also self-report that repurchases are being carried out to enhance
shareholder value. This term is ambiguous. The firm could be either signaling
undervaluation or conducting a repurchase as an effective use of free cash flows. If firms
are credibly announcing a repurchase to enhance shareholder value, then the repurchase
should be met with a positive stock price reaction.

Results

significantly less variation in operating income and have higher dividend payout ratios than infrequent
repurchasers that are initiated by smaller firms with potentially higher degrees of asymmetric information.
This suggests that smaller firms are more likely to repurchase for the positive motivation of signaling
undervaluation.
42
Comment and Jarrell, 1991 document that the stronger the premium offered for shares, the stronger the
signal of undervaluation and measure the undervaluation signal by the type of repurchase.
43
Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 1981; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen,
1995; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998.
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Table 2-4 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the opportunistic
purposes of funding a stock option plan, for an acquisition and to counteract dilution. The
CARs for the Pre-event window, at the announcement date and three post-announcement
windows are shown using the ordinary least squares market model and the ScholesWilliams market model in comparison to the equal-weighted and value-weighted CRSP
market indexes. Consistent with others’ research, the pre-event abnormal returns are
consistently significantly negative for all models and repurchase purposes. Past research
has shown significantly positive announcement day returns. My research also shows
consistent positive returns. However, Hypothesis 1 is supported in that the abnormal
returns are less positive for the opportunistic repurchase plans. For example, with the
market model the (-1, +1) window for the non-opportunistic repurchase plans has a CAR
of 3.04 percent, whereas the stock-option repurchase plan, the plan to counteract dilution,
and the plan to fund an acquisition have CARs of 2.22percent, 1.57 percent, and 1.82
percent, respectively.
Consistent with others, I generally find persistence in positive abnormal returns.
Kahle (2002) found that firms that repurchased shares to fund employee stock options
were not as positive as firms that did not repurchase to cover employee options. Contrary
to her work, I found that the repurchases for funding an option plan performed well.
Kahle compared firms that repurchased their shares with firms that increased their
dividends during a four-year period. I choose to use a more robust sample of firms over
an eight-year period that repurchased their shares for the purpose of funding an option
plan, and compared my sample with both the CRSP equal-weighted and value-weighted
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benchmark portfolios. I found the market model equal-weighted CARs were 23.41
percent and 32.60 percent for the two-year and three-year post event windows. These
results were all significant and very similar to the non-opportunistic plans (21.00 percent
and 31.77 percent for the two-year and three-year post returns). My hypotheses proposed
that opportunistic repurchase plans should not perform as well as undervaluation or free
cash flow motivated plans. Although originally classified as an opportunistic plan,
employee stock option plans are not serving only the firms’ executives’ interest, but may
be serving all the firms’ employees. Later tables investigate the CEO’s options and
ownership separately in order to distinguish opportunistic repurchases in a clearer
framework.
Loughran and Vijh find that stock acquirers earn 24.2 percent less than their
matched firms, on average, using buy-and-hold returns over a five-year period; whereas
cash acquirers earn 18.5 percent more than their matched firms. Rau and Vermaelen
(1998) find that bidders in mergers underperform for up to three years after the merger is
complete. Thus, I hypothesized that firms that used a repurchase plan to facilitate an
acquisition should not perform as well as the non-opportunistic repurchase plans.
Although the shorter post-event time windows were less positive (non-significant), it is
interesting that the post two-year and three-year returns were significantly positive
(CARs of 29.42 percent and 41.49 percent, respectively). Thus, in the long-term, using a
repurchase plan to finance an acquisition can be beneficial to the bidder and appears to
act more like a cash-financed acquisition. This will be explored further in the next
chapter.
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Finally, the repurchase plan to counteract dilution reacted as predicted. All postevent day CARs are small and not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the
two-year (-2.51 percent) and three-year (-0.62 percent) are negative. Thus, to counteract
dilution does not carry with it the positive abnormal returns that other repurchase
purposes carry.
In order to further differentiate the purpose of repurchase, I investigate the levels
of free cash flows in my sample of firms and also the CEO ownership levels, and present
the results in table 2-5A and 2-5B. These tables look at the difference in mean CARs for
the pre-event window, at the announcement date and a short window of 30 days post
announcement, and finally two-years and three-years post announcement. Table 2-5A
presents a 3X5 matrix of free cash flows (high, medium and low) and ownership levels (0
percent, less than 1 percent, 1 percent to 5 percent, 5 percent to 25 percent, and greater
than 25 percent). The event-day CARs are interestingly negative for the high free cash
flow and CEO stock ownership of greater than 25 percent (-4.82 percent), the medium
level of free cash flow and greater than 25 percent ownership (-0.48 percent), and high
free cash flows and ownership level between five percent and 25 percent (-0.45 percent).
The p-values of .006 and .000 for the two-year and three-year indicate that these
groups are significantly different from each other. At two-year post announcement the
high free cash flow and five percent to 25 percent ownership group has a CAR of -47.5
percent while there are strong positive CARs for low free cash flows and five percent to
25 percent ownership (+86.6 percent) and low cash flows and zero ownership (+68.8
percent). At three-year post event the high free cash flow and five percent to 25 percent
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ownership group has a CAR of -44.2 percent and the high free cash flows and one
percent to five percent group has a CAR of -5.23 percent, while there are strong positive
CARs for low free cash flows and five percent to 25 ownership (+157.8 percent) and low
free cash flows and zero ownership (81.5 percent).
Table 2-5B presents a 3X3 matrix of free cash flows (high, medium and low) and
ownership levels (high, medium and low). This table shows significant CARs at two-year
and three-year post announcement. The only negative CARs shown are for the high free
cash flow and low ownership group (-4.1 percent and -2.2 percent for post two-years and
three-years respectively). Arguably this group has the most likely agency problems. The
highest positive or best performing group is the low free cash flow and high ownership
group (45.3 percent and 66.3 percent). This high ownership group presumably has little
agency problems and thus is conducting the repurchase with both owners’ and managers’
objectives. Since cash flows are low, this group is likely to have a strong motivation to
make the cash draining decision to repurchase its shares. It is likely that this group is
making a very credible announcement that its current market price is low.
I noted earlier the somewhat surprising result where repurchasing to fund an
option plan has very similar results to all the non-opportunistic repurchases plans. Tables
2-6 and 2-7 explore CEO options further to distinguish between funding for an employee
option plan, which may not be opportunistic and the level of CEO options, which may
lend itself to opportunistic motivations.
In table 2-6 the repurchase sample is grouped by the value of the exercisable stock
options held by the CEO divided by the CEO’s salary and bonus. Four groups were
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determined: no options held, low option value (value of exercisable options is less than
20 percent of the CEO’s salary and bonus), medium option value (value is between 20
percent and 150 percent) and high option value (greater than 150 percent). The results in
table 2-6 are not significant; however, it should be noted that the highest CARs in the
long term are shown for the medium option levels. It may be that there exist an optimum
level of option grants; high enough to motivate the manager to act in the owners’ interest
and low enough to keep the cost of the option less than the motivational benefit.
Table 2-7 presents a 5X4 matrix of CEO ownership levels (zero, less than one
percent, one to five percent, five to 25 percent and greater than 25 percent) and option
levels (no, low, medium and high). Panel A of this table shows significant CARs mean
differences at two-year and three-year post announcement. The groups with negative
CARs at two-year post repurchase announcement are: five-to 25 percent ownership and
medium options (-54.8 percent); five-to-25 percent ownership and low options (-51.5
percent); one-to-five percent ownership and zero options; (-9.9 percent), and zero
ownership and no options (-0.1 percent). Due to some small sample size groups, the one
to five percent ownership and zero options (n=122) is the only group with negative
abnormal returns from which we can state that its negative returns are significant. The
one-to-five percent ownership and zero options group also shows the same lackluster
returns for the three-year post period of –10.8 percent. It is interesting to point out that
the motivation to repurchase stock for any groups receiving no options cannot be to cover
options. Thus the poor performance of the one-to-five percent group with no options is
not a reflection of repurchasing due to the necessity of covering option commitments.
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Focusing on just the two-year and three-year significant periods and only groups
with greater than 20 observations, it is interesting to note that the best two-year return
performance is the zero ownership and no option group. This group also has the
distinction of being the second best performers at the three-year post announcement. This
is consistent with option granting and CEO ownership not influencing performance or
possibly the cost of the options does not outweigh the benefit of improved CEO
performance. In other words it may be that option granting may increase the effort of the
CEO, but not enough to affect the bottom line. This is an area that requires future study.
The worst return performance group’s CEOs own one to five percent of the corporation’s
stock and receive no options.
Consistent with agency theory, the best group performance three-years post
announcement is the one-to-five ownership group receiving a medium level of options. I
expect this group’s interests would be well aligned with those of the shareholders because
the managers have a moderate level of ownership, but not too much to be guilty of
entrenchment and also receive a moderate level of options that should motivate the
managers without the options costing so much too outweigh the benefit.
Strong positive abnormal returns (two-year 52.4 percent and three-year 65.1
percent) are found for the 1 percent to 5 percent CEO ownership and middle option group
(n=34) and (two-year 39.3 percent and three-year 56.4 percent) for the zero ownership
and no option (n=81).
In order to address the problem of some of the small sample-sized groups, panel B
of table 2-7 shows just seven groups formed by combining the medium and low option
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groups, including the zero ownership groups with the less than one percent ownership
groups, and blending the one to five percent ownership and five-to-25 percent ownership
into a one-to-25 percent ownership group. The best performances are seen by the greater
than 25 percent ownership group with two-year and three-year abnormal returns of 47.3
percent and 41.2 percent respectively and the one-to-25 percent ownership and the
medium and low option group with two-year and three-year abnormal returns of 44.4
percent and 28.7 percent respectively. This group would be the optimal alignment of
managers and stockholders interests group. Unexpected performance is observed by the
one to 25 percent ownership with no option group with two-year and three-year abnormal
returns of –0.4 percent and 9.7 percent, respectively. Thus, it appears that not only does
the existing ownership level matter, but it is also necessary to provide future incentives in
the form of moderate option grants.
Much of the recent literature has focused attention on open-market conducted
repurchases due to the growth in numbers and the increase in the value of the
repurchases. Researchers have suggested that the repurchases are substitutes for
dividends or are the direct result of compensation-based option grants and the needs of
the firms to cover their options and avoid dilution effects. There is a general consensus
that the increase in open-market repurchases is due at least in part to the growth in option
grants.44 Thus, it is likely that the incentives for open-market repurchases have changed
over time. However, what has happened to Dutch-auction and fixed-price tender offers
over time? During the 1990s the frequency of initiation has not increased as open-market
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repurchases have proliferated. Do firms still elect to use these methods to signal
undervaluation (see Comment and Jarrell (1991) ) or as a takeover deterrent (see Persons
(1994)?
Table 2-8 displays the cumulative abnormal returns for the market model and
Scholes-Williams model for the different types of repurchases, Dutch-auction, fixed-price
tender offers and open-market repurchases. Data is shown yearly from 1995-2002.
Using the results from the value-weighted market model returns, open-market
repurchasers perform the worst prior to the announcement with a CAR mean over time of
–7.17 percent and fixed-price offers performed well with a mean over time of 4.32
percent. The at-announcement date abnormal returns for open-market repurchases range
from a mean of 2.24 percent (1997) to 3.91 percent (2000), the smallest sample year.
Both fixed price and Dutch-auction carry the higher event-day returns (fixed price ranges
from 2.93 percent (1996) to 19.67 percent (1995) and Dutch auction from 4.55 percent
(1995) to 13.23 percent (2002)) and at first glance there is no trend over time.
A review of the long-term abnormal returns for Dutch auction repurchases shows
erratic returns ranging from –25.52 percent (2001) to 86.9 percent (2000) for the twoyear post returns and ranging from-21.98 percent (1996) to 118.89 percent (2000) for
three-years. The fixed price tender offers also show a wide range of returns over the
years. The erratic returns over years for the Dutch-auction and fixed price tender offers is
most likely influenced by small sample sizes ranging from as low as 6 events in a year to
only a high of 24 repurchase announcements.
44

Jolls, 1998; Dittmar, 2000; Liang and Sharpe, 2000; Jagannathan and Stephens, 2001; Klassen and
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Table 2-9 is a multi-model table addressing several hypotheses. The five panels
A-E display the coefficients for pre-announcement, at the announcement and postannouncement time periods (30 day, two-year and three-year). Six fixed-effects models
are displayed in panel A. Although my hypotheses did not address the cumulative
abnormal returns prior to the repurchase announcement, this panel shows some
interesting results. The share percent variable (aggregate shares held by the CEO divided
by the number of common shares outstanding) is significantly negative. This implies that
the greater the percent of shares owned by the CEO the more negative the returns prior to
making a repurchase announcement. The three-year least squares annual growth rate of
net income variable is also significantly negative implying the higher the net income
growth the more negative the cumulative abnormal returns prior to the repurchase
initiation. Not surprisingly, firms that announce a repurchase due to undervaluation also
have significantly negative CARs before the announcement, whereas firms that plan to
fund a stock option plan perform well.
My hypotheses questions opportunistic repurchases at the announcement date.
Panel B displays 8 models addressing the event date announcement CARs. A look at the
significant estimates reveals the stock value (aggregate value of stock options held by the
CEO as a percentage of salary and bonus) is positive. This implies a direct relationship to
the CEO’s option value and the stock’s return reaction at the repurchase event.
As predicted, firms that announce a repurchase to counteract dilution effect do
poorly (significantly negative in models six and eight). Also, predicted the non-

Sivakumar, 2001; Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong, 2002; and Kahle, 2002.
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opportunistic purpose of enhancing shareholder value is positive (significant in models
one and two). I had also predicted, non-positive returns for both repurchases for
acquisitions and for stock option plans. Although negative estimators appear in several
models, none are significant.
The strongest estimator is with firms announcing a Dutch-auction repurchase.
Although the positive returns with a Dutch-auction is consistent with others’ research, it
is not consistent to find the returns stronger than the fixed-price tender offers (negative,
not significant) which carries a higher premium by virtue of its makeup.
Panel C displays the short-term stock price reactions from two days to 30 days
post announcement. For this period both control measures of price to book were
significantly negative. As with the event time period, stock value is slightly positive. In
the short-term none of the repurchase purposes show any significance. The frequency
control is negative in one model and positive (not significant) in another. Dutch-auction
and fixed-price repurchases show expected strong positive estimators; however, similar
to the event day results the Dutch-auction firms have stronger positive returns than the
fixed-price offers.
Panels D and E show two-years and three-years post announcement, respectively.
During these time periods, Dutch-auction and fixed-price repurchases no longer show any
superiority in returns over open-market repurchase plans. Generally for both long-term
periods net income to assets is slightly negative, share percent is slightly positive and
both income growth and earnings per share growth negative.
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Overwhelming the purpose to counteract dilution is significantly negative in all
models as predicted by the hypotheses. However, the hypothesis also predicted negative
return reactions for firms funding stock option plans. This did not bear out and in fact by
three-years post announcement funding the stock option plan was significantly positive. I
had also predicted that the purpose of funding an acquisition would have the negative
results found with most acquisition research. This estimator although generally negative
was only significant in one model.
Two surprisingly results of slightly negative returns at three-years post repurchase
announcement for the purpose of enhancing shareholder value and for the purpose of
undervaluation. It appears that the manager’s purpose of repurchase did not occur.
In summary, the purpose to counteract dilution is strongly negative in all models.
This supports the argument that opportunistic repurchases do not perform as well as other
repurchases. Contrary to the hypothesis, I again find that stock option plans have
significantly positive long-term cumulative abnormal returns. The acquisition motivated
repurchase is negative, as expected, but not significant. In the long-term, whether the
repurchase was completed with a Dutch auction or fixed price tender offer was not
significant.

Conclusion
The purpose of the repurchase announcement matters. At the announcement date
manager’s intention of avoiding dilution is significantly negative and enhancing
shareholder value is significantly positive. However, more interesting results are
observed at two-years and three-years post announcement. Counteracting dilution is not a
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good reason to conduct a repurchase and although not as strongly negative, enhancing
shareholder value does not bear out its announcement promise. Consistent with a rich
history of acquisition work, conducting an acquisition in conjunction with a repurchase
seems to carry the negative attributes of the acquisition-driven motivation. This will be
explored further in the next chapter.
The strongest positive reason to conduct a repurchase is to initiate or fund an
employee stock option plan. Both employee benefit plans and stock option plans carry
positive abnormal returns well into future time periods. This is contrary to the results
found by Kahle (2002). Although it was expected that stock options would fall under
opportunistic CEO behavior, very different results were found. A probable explanation is
that stock options not only benefit the CEO but also employees and outside shareholders.
Furthermore, when the ownership structure of the sample of repurchase firms was
investigated, a few unexpected results surfaced. For example, the largest positive
abnormal returns were found for a subsample of firms in which the CEOs had no stock
ownership and no option grants. It is not known whether these CEOs have an alternative
form of incentive based pay or if the cost of the options simply outweighs the benefit of
improved CEO performance.
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Table 2- 1

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Total

Types of Repurchase Announcements
Number of Repurchase Announcements
Dutch-auction
Fixed-price
Open Market
17
16
6
3
8
5
7
9
17
21
24
18
17
9
11
188

36
56
51
52
36
37
38
8
11
14
6
14
13
9
16
397

136
279
396
115
114
260
408
493
691
664
647
415
320
177
399
5515
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Table 2- 2 Hypothesized Relationships
Hypothesized relationships between repurchase event return and firm characteristics

Hypothesis

Variable

Predicted Sign

Hypothesis variables
Offset dilution
Fully diluted eps/basis eps
Dummy variable for firms reporting as purpose
Acquisition
Dummy variable for firms reporting as purpose
Managerial
CEO Equity Ownership
Ownership
Share Ownership Value
Share Ownership Value + Stock Option Value
Control variables
Free cash
Operating income before depreciation/assets
Net income before taxes and minority
interest/assets
Net income before extraordinary items and
discontinued operations/assets
Net income before extraordinary items and
discontinued operations less preferred
dividends/assets
Under-valuation
Book-to-market
Dummy variable for frequent repurchasers
Dummy variable for firms reporting as purpose
Signaling
Type of Repurchase

Enhance Sh. Value Dummy variable for firms reporting as purpose
Risk
Beta
Leverage: Long-term debt/assets
Long-term debt/market value
Debt/Assets
Other Controls
Size
Year
Dummy variable for frequent repurchases
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+
+
+

+
+
+
Fixed +++
Dutch ++
Open +
+
+
+
+
+
?
-

Table 2- 3

Variable Definitions

Acquisition dummy variable = dumACQ = SDC repurchase purchase code ACQ.
Beta = CRSP beta
Black Scholes option value = BlkVal = The aggregate value of stock options granted to
the executive during the year as valued using S&P's Black Scholes methodology
(ExecuComp BLK_VALU).
DA = Repurchase announcement was a Dutch-auction offer.
Debt/Assets = Total debt (Compustat DLTT + LCT) / assets (Compustat TA)
Dilution dummy variable = dumDIL = SDC repurchase purchase code DIL.
Employee Benefit Plan dummy variable = dumEBP = SDC repurchase purchase code
EBP.
Enhance shareholder value dummy variable = dumESV = SDC repurchase purchase
code ESV.
EpsDil-1 = the diluted eps/basis eps for the year prior to the repurchase announcement.
EpsDil_0 = = the diluted eps/basis eps for the year of the repurchase announcement=
Fully diluted eps/basis eps =Fully diluted reported since December 15, 1997 (APB
opinion No. 15 and Financial Accounting Standards No. 128) Basic EPS is earning
available to common shareholders divided by the weighted average of shares
outstanding. Diluted EPS increase the number of shares in the denominator to reflect
the dilutive effects of convertible securities and stock options and adds back to earnings
the interest payments that would not have to be made by the firm upon the conversion
of bonds/preferred stock to common stock.
EPS growth = EPSgrow = the three-year least squares annual growth rate of Net
Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less preferred dividend
requirements (ExecuComp EPSEX3LS).
Exercisable unexercised options = The number of unexercised options that the
executive held at the end of the year that were vested options (ExecuComp
UEXNUMEX).
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Table 2- 3

Variable Definitions (Continued)

Exercised options = Soptexsh = the number of options exercised by the executive
during the year (ExecuComp SOPTEXSH).
Exercised options value = Soptexer = the net value realized from exercising options. It
is the difference in value between the exercise price of the options and the market
price of the company's stock on the date of exercise (ExecuComp SOPTEXER/1000).
Exercised to total available options = Exercised options (SOPTEXSH) / Exercised
options + exercisable unexercised (SOPTEXSH + UEXNUMEX) This gives the
percentage of options exercised that were exercisable (vested).
FP = Repurchase announcement was a Fixed-price tender offer.
Frequent Repurchaser = Freq = Firm made more than one repurchase announcement
during the year.
Less Frequent Repurchases = Somefreq = Firm made more than one repurchase
during the three-year period, but not more than one during the year.
Long-term debt/assets = long-term debt (Compustat DLT) / assets (Compustat TA)
Long-term debt/market value = long-term debt (Compustat DLT) / market value
(Compustat MKVALF)
Market value = MktVal = market value (Compustat MKVALF/1000).
Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations/assets =
ExecuComp NIBEX/Assets
Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less preferred
dividends/assets = NI/assets = ExecuComp NIAC/Assets.
Net income before taxes and minority interest/assets = ExecuComp PRETAX/Assets
NI growth = net income growth = The 3-year least squares annual growth rate of Net
Income (ExecuComp NI3LS)
Operating income before depreciation/assets = ExecuComp OIBD/Assets
Operating Income growth = IncGrow = The three-year least squares annual growth of
Operating Income before depreciation (ExecuComp OIBD3LS).
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Table 2- 3

Variable Definitions (Continued)

Option grant value = Soptval = the aggregate value of all options granted to the CEO
during the year as valued by the company (ExecuComp SOPTVAL).
Payout ratio = Total common dividends (item 21) / Net income
Percent Sought = Total share repurchased (SDC total shares repurchased) / Total
shares outstanding (SDC Number of securities outstanding)
Purpose Code: The code describing the purpose of the repurchase program. Examples
are: to enhance shareholder value (ESV) to offset dilution (DIL) to support a stock
option program (STP), to indicate undervaluation (ULV), to fund and acquisition
(ACQ), for an employee benefit plan (EBP), and for general business (GEN).
Price to book = The market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where
the market value of assets is the book value of assets plus the market value of equity
(Compustat item #24 times Compustat item #25) minus the book value of equity.
PrcBk-1 = Price to book for the year ending prior to the repurchase announcement.
PrcBk_0 = Price to book for the year of the repurchase announcement.
Share % = CEO equity = The aggregate shares held by the CEO divided by the
number of common shares outstanding (ExecuComp SHROWN/SHRSOUT)
Share Ownership Value = Market value of the common shares held by executive
divided by the executive's salary and bonus (ExecuComp PRCC*SHROWN/TCC)
Share Ownership Value + Stock Option Value = Market value of the common shares
held by executive plus the aggregate value of stock options granted to the executive
during the year as valued using S&P's Black Scholes methodology divided by the
executive's salary and bonus (ExecuComp (PRCC*SHROWN + BLK_VALU)/TCC)
Stock Option Plan dummy variable = dumSTP = SDC repurchase purchase code STP.
Stock Option Value = StkVal = The aggregate value of stock options granted to the
executive during the year as valued using S&P's Black Scholes methodology divided
by the executive's salary and bonus (ExecuComp (BLK_VALU)/TCC).
Type of Repurchase = SDC Technique code. OP = open market, DA = Dutch=auction,
and FPOL = fixed-price tender-offer
Undervaluation dummy variable = dumUVL = SDC repurchase purchase code UVL.
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Table 2- 4 Returns to Repurchase Purpose
Cumulative Abnormal Market model returns (CARs) for both equal and
value weighted portfolios of all firms Announcing Repurchase Plans to
Fund a Stock Option Plan (n=482, beta = 1.06)
Market Model
Scholes-Williams Market Model
Window Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30, -2
-3.82% ***
-4.87% ***
-4.14% ***
-5.04% ***
-1,+1
2.22% ***
2.02% ***
2.15% ***
1.97% ***
+2,+30
1.98% **
1.67% *
1.93% **
1.62% *
+31,+504
23.41% ***
24.20% ***
21.46% ***
23.14% ***
+31,+756
32.60% ***
33.88% ***
29.96% ***
33.03% ***
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
Cumulative Abnormal Market model returns (CARs) for both equal and
value weighted portfolios of all firms Announcing Repurchase Plans to
Fund an Acquisition (n=96, beta = 0.75)
Market Model
Scholes-Williams Market Model
Window Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30, -2
-2.84%
-2.67%
-1.14%
-3.64%
-1,+1
1.57% **
1.68% ***
1.67% **
1.56% **
+2,+30
0.91%
1.97%
1.05%
1.27%
+31,+504
29.42% ***
30.47% ***
49.41% ***
17.94% ***
+31,+756
41.49% ***
45.92% ***
72.15% ***
26.75% ***
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
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Table 2- 4 Returns to Repurchase Purpose (continued)
Cumulative Abnormal Market model returns (CARs) for both equal and
value weighted portfolios of all firms Announcing Repurchase Plans to
Counteract Dilution (n=126, beta = 1.27)
Market Model
Scholes-Williams Market Model
Window Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30, -2
-3.72% **
-4.33% **
-3.74% **
-4.27% **
-1,+1
1.82% **
1.75% **
1.75% **
1.67% **
+2,+30
2.03%
1.68%
1.61%
1.20%
+31,+504
-2.51% *
3.07%
-2.28% *
2.54%
-0.62% *
6.16%
-0.60% *
6.63%
+31,+756
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
Cumulative Abnormal Market model returns (CARs) for both equal and
value weighted portfolios of all firms Announcing Repurchase Plans for
purposes other than to fund a stock option plan, to fund an acquisition or to
counteract dilution (n=3814, beta = 0.94)
Market Model
Scholes-Williams Market Model
Window Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30, -2
-5.36% ***
-6.44% ***
-5.42% ***
-6.53% ***
-1,+1
3.04% ***
2.94% ***
3.05% ***
2.92% ***
+2,+30
1.75% ***
1.83% ***
1.86% ***
1.57% ***
+31,+504
21.00% ***
22.40% ***
21.53% ***
19.63% ***
+31,+756
31.77% ***
34.84% ***
32.56% ***
31.23% ***
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
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Table 2-5 Free Cash Flow and Executive Ownership
A. The share ownership percentage is the number of shares held by the top executive
(excluding stock options) divided by the number of common shares outstanding
(ExecuComp variables SHROWN/SRSOUT). I have determined five levels of executive
ownership; ZeroOwn (executive owns zero shares), Less1Own (less than one percent),
1_5Own (between one and five percent), 5_25Own (between five and 25 percent),
Great25Own (greater than 25 percent).
Free cash flows are proxied with three calculations; operating income before depreciation
divided by assets, net income before tax divided by assets, and net income available
divided by assets. I placed the highest 30 percent of the free cash flow calculations in the
high cash flow group, HCF; the next 40 percent of the free cash flow calculations in the
medium group, MCF; and the lowest 30 percent of the free cash flows in the low free
cash flow group, LCF. In some cases the three free cash flow proxies yielded a different
classification. In such cases, the average classification was used. For example if one
proxy calculation classified as high, another as medium and the final as low, the firm
would be classified as MCF.
Finally, 15 groups were form by taking members of each ownership group (5) and
combining it with members of each free cash flow group (3). ANOVA follows for the
group differences of the abnormal returns for five event time periods. Groups are sorted
from lowest to highest average abnormal return.
Group
n
(-30, -2)
(-1, +1) (+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756)
HCF 1_5Own
63
-0.084
0.021
0.009
0.003
-0.052
HCF 5_25OWN
13
-0.087
-0.005
0.100
-0.475
-0.442
HCF Great25Own 6
-0.063
-0.048
0.008
0.106
0.336
HCF Less1Own
207
-0.085
0.008
0.018
0.015
0.069
HCF ZeroOwn
22
-0.068
0.023
0.021
0.568
0.645
LCF 1_5Own
32
-0.132
0.000
0.012
0.271
0.357
LCF 5_25OWN
14
-0.031
0.041
0.074
0.864
1.578
LCF Great25Own
5
-0.116
0.106
-0.003
0.477
0.356
LCF Less1Own
150
-0.048
0.017
0.035
0.206
0.453
LCF ZeroOwn
13
-0.087
0.038
0.031
0.688
0.815
MCF 1_5Own
70
-0.087
0.021
-0.001
0.082
0.112
MCF 5_25OWN
37
-0.049
-0.005
0.007
0.055
0.174
MCF
12
-0.094
0.031
0.015
0.550
0.613
Great25Own
MCF Less1Own
306
-0.044
0.016
0.013
0.016
0.031
MCF ZeroOwn
31
-0.032
0.003
-0.020
0.046
0.138
P-value
0.453
0.086
0.783
0.006
0.000
Table 2-5 Free Cash Flow and Executive Ownership (Continued)
B Ownership is proxied with three calculations; executive shares owned divided by
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common shares outstanding, the market value of the common shares held by executive
divided by the executive’s salary and bonus, and the share ownership value plus the
Black Scholes option value divided by the executives salary and bonus. The highest 30
percent of the executive ownership level were placed in the high ownership, HOwn; the
next 40 percent in the medium group, MOwn; and the lowest 30 percent in the low
ownership group, LOwn. In cases where the three ownership proxies yielded a different
classification, the average classification was used.
Free cash flows are proxied by three calculations; operating income before depreciation
divided by assets, net income before tax divided by assets, and net income available
divided by assets. The highest 30 percent of the free cash flow calculations were placed
in the high cash flow group, HCF; the next 40 percent in the medium group, MCF; and
the lowest 30 percent in the low free cash flow group, LCF. In some cases the three free
cash flow proxies yielded a different classification. In such cases, the average was used.
Finally, nine groups were form by taking members of each ownership group (3) and
combining it with members of each free cash flow group (3). ANOVA follows for the
group differences of the abnormal returns for five event time periods noted.
Panel A Groups
HCF Hown
HCF Lown
HCF Mown
LCF Hown
LCF Lown
LCF Mown
MCF Hown
MCF Lown
MCF Mown
P-value

n (-30, -2) (-1, +1) (+2, +30)
88 -0.077
0.006
0.020
89 -0.081
0.013
-0.001
134 -0.089
0.011
0.033
53 -0.084
0.010
0.029
80 -0.054
0.027
0.040
81 -0.059
0.018
0.028
138 -0.066
0.014
0.021
112 -0.053
0.002
0.014
206 -0.041
0.022
-0.005
980 0.539
0.385
0.417

(+31, +504)
0.108
-0.041
0.038
0.453
0.183
0.292
0.080
0.018
0.038
0.087

(+31, +756)
0.218
-0.022
0.035
0.663
0.477
0.482
0.138
0.043
0.056
0.037

Panel B Groups
HCF Lown
LCF Mown
P-value

88
81

(+31, +504)
-0.041
0.292
0.037

(+31, +756)
-0.022
0.482
0.016

Panel C Groups
HCF Lown
LCF Hown
P-value

88
53

(+31, +504)
-0.041
0.453
0.013

(+31, +756)
-0.022
0.663
0.007
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Table 2-6

Executive Options

Executive option value is determined by the value of the exercisable stock option divided
by the total salary and bonus (ExecuComp variables SOPTEXER/TCC). I have
determined four option value levels They are no or zero value of exercisable options,
NoOpt; low value of exercisable options, LOpt (value of exercisable options is less than
20 percent of the executive’s salary and bonus); medium value of exercisable options,
MOpt (value of exercisable options is between 20 and 150 percent of the executive’s
salary and bonus); and a high option level, HOpt (value of exercisable options is greater
than 150 percent of the executive’s salary and bonus).
ANOVA follows for the group differences of the abnormal returns for five event time
periods: 30 days to two days prior to the repurchase announcement (-30, -2), the event
period (-1, +1), 30 days post-announcement (+2, +30), two-years post-announcement
(+31, +504), and three-years post-announcement.
Panel A Groups
Hopt
Lopt
Mopt
NOopt
P-value

n (-30, -2)
159 -0.070
79 -0.070
156 -0.044
583 -0.068
976 0.579

(-1, +1)
0.024
0.018
0.006
0.014
0.191

(+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756)
0.008
0.132
0.215
0.026
0.164
0.249
0.035
0.183
0.308
0.013
0.054
0.116
0.409
0.436
0.358

Panel B Groups
Hopt
Lopt
Mopt
P-value

n (-30, -2)
159 -0.070
79 -0.070
156 -0.044
393 0.491

(-1, +1)
0.024
0.018
0.006
0.063

(+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756)
0.008
0.132
0.215
0.026
0.164
0.249
0.035
0.183
0.308
0.388
0.896
0.804

Panel C Groups
Hopt
Lopt&Mopt
P-value

n (-30, -2)
159 -0.070
235 -0.053
393 0.424

(-1, +1)
0.024
0.010
0.046

(+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756)
0.008
0.132
0.215
0.032
0.177
0.288
0.187
0.656
0.571
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Table 2- 7 Executive Ownership and Options
The share ownership percentage is the number of shares held by the top executive
(excluding stock options) divided by the number of common shares outstanding. Five
levels of executive ownership are ZeroOwn (executive owns zero shares), Less1Own
(less than one percent), 1_5Own (between one and five percent), 5_25Own (between five
and 25 percent), Great25Own (greater than 25 percent).
Executive option value is determined by the value of the exercisable stock option divided
by the total salary and bonus. Four option value levels are no or zero value of exercisable
options, NoOpt; low value of exercisable options, LOpt (value of exercisable options is
less than 20 percent); medium value of exercisable options, MOpt (value of exercisable
options is between 20 and 150 percent); and a high option level, HOpt (value of
exercisable options is greater than 150 percent of the executive’s salary and bonus).
Finally, 18 groups were form by taking members of each ownership group (5) and
combining it with members of each option level group (4) (Two groups have no
members.). ANOVA follows for the group differences of the abnormal returns for five
event time periods: 30 days to two days prior to the repurchase announcement (-30, -2),
the event period (-1, +1), 30 days post-announcement (+2, +30), two-years postannouncement (+31, +504), and three-years post-announcement.
Panel A Groups
1_5Own HOpt
1_5Own LOpt
1_5Own MOpt
1_5Own NOpt
5_25Own HOpt
5_25Own LOpt
5_25Own MOpt
5_25Own NOpt
Great25Own HOpt
Great25Own LOpt
Great25Own NOpt
Less 1Own HOpt
Less 1Own LOpt
Less 1Own MOpt
Less 1Own NOpt
ZeroOwn HOpt
ZeroOwn MOpt
ZeroOwn NOpt
P-value

n
(-30, -2)
52 -0.084
15 -0.124
34 -0.056
122 -0.081
10 0.008
2 -0.065
11 -0.061
60 -0.061
2 -0.886
1 -0.112
21 -0.074
145 -0.062
93 -0.051
166 -0.034
513 -0.063
4 -0.059
4 -0.133
81 -0.053
1335 0.000

(-1, +1)
0.013
0.052
0.024
0.013
0.010
-0.171
-0.014
0.015
-0.004
0.066
0.029
0.021
0.021
0.008
0.009
0.048
-0.008
0.013
0.156
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(+2, +30) (+31, +504) (+31, +756)
0.046
0.167
0.294
-0.044
0.462
0.694
0.041
0.524
0.651
0.002
-0.099
-0.108
0.012
0.363
0.653
-0.083
-0.515
-0.583
0.014
-0.548
-0.450
0.037
0.192
0.521
0.179
1.509
1.586
0.059
1.148
0.863
-0.027
0.332
0.420
0.006
0.101
0.218
0.026
0.244
0.325
0.016
0.139
0.299
0.016
0.065
0.138
0.020
-0.001
0.138
0.132
0.867
0.938
-0.013
0.393
0.564
0.559
0.003
0.006

Table 2-7 Executive Ownership and Option (Continued)
Panel B Groups
n (-30, -2) (-1, +1) (+2, +30)
1_25Own/Hopt
62
-0.069
0.012
0.040
1_25Own/MLopt
62
-0.074
0.018
0.012
1_25Own/Nopt
182 -0.074
0.013
0.013
Great25
28
-0.115
0.023
0.005
Less1/Hopt
150 -0.062
0.022
0.006
Less1/MLopt
263 -0.042
0.012
0.021
Less1/Nopt
594 -0.061
0.009
0.012
P-value
1340 0.444
0.717
0.857

63

(+31, +504)
0.198
0.287
-0.004
0.412
0.098
0.187
0.110
0.197

(+31, +756)
0.352
0.441
0.097
0.473
0.216
0.318
0.197
0.339

Table 2- 8 Type of Repurchase Abnormal Returns Pre-Event CAR
Dutch-Auction
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Year
n
B Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
1995
9 0.96 -0.45%
1.24%
-1.14%
0.47%
1996
17 0.61 1.15%
-1.10%
0.77%
-0.94%
1997
21 1.01 -4.38%
-1.69%
-5.81%
-2.73%
1998
24 0.85 -5.07%
-5.89%
-4.67%
-5.76%
1999
18 0.78 0.43%
1.16%
0.68%
1.15%
2000
17 0.58 -2.12%
-0.40%
-0.98%
0.00%
2001
9 1.05 -7.67%
1.35%
-9.39% *
0.38%
2002
11 0.56 -1.66%
-2.87%
-1.35%
-2.43%
1995-2002 126 0.84 -2.49% * -1.51% * -2.66% * -1.67% *
Fixed Price
Year
n
1995
8
1996
11
1997
14
1998
6
1999
14
2000
13
2001
9
2002
16
1995-2002 91

B
0.96
0.61
1.01
0.85
0.78
0.58
1.05
0.56
0.84

Open Market
Year
n
B
1995
493 0.96
1996
691 0.61
1997
664 1.01
1998
647 0.85
1999
415 0.78
2000
320 0.58
2001
177 1.05
2002
399 0.56
1995-2002 3806 0.84

Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
4.39%
6.00%
6.10%
5.83%
0.42%
1.67%
0.80%
1.69%
-2.86%
-2.23%
-2.74%
-2.11%
6.57%
-0.57%
4.34%
-1.21%
2.02%
3.77%
1.33%
3.18%
11.82%
9.36%
12.88% * 10.47%
20.43% ** 21.19% ** 19.83% ** 20.96% **
0.91%
-0.26%
0.70%
0.16%
4.61%
4.32%
4.63%
4.40%
Market Model
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-2.52% *** -2.75%
-3.27% ** -4.30%
-4.08% *** -5.24%
-7.90% *** -12.44%
-8.76% *** -7.54%
-11.75% *** -13.88%
-5.57% *** -6.17%
-4.48% *** -6.99%
-5.65% *** -7.17%
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***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-2.60% *** -6.06%
-3.31% *** -4.33%
-3.80% *** -5.85%
-8.07% *** -12.32%
-9.15% *** -7.92%
-11.83% *** -13.52%
-6.62% *** -6.08%
-4.83% *** -6.76%
-5.78% *** -7.29%

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Table 2- 8 Type of Repurchase (continued) At Announcement CARs (-1,+1)
Dutch-Auction
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Year
n
B Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
1995
9 0.96 4.41% *** 4.55% *** 4.37% *
4.38%
*
1996
17 0.61 9.32% *** 9.12% *** 9.32% *** 9.14% ***
1997
21 1.01 9.66% ** 10.06% *** 9.63% *** 10.14% ***
1998
24 0.85 8.24% *** 8.17% *** 8.36% *** 8.25% ***
1999
18 0.78 7.93% *** 7.91% *** 7.91% *** 7.78% **
2000
17 0.58 12.96% *** 12.79% *** 12.91% *** 12.81% ***
2001
9 1.05 9.50% ** 9.80% ** 9.53% *** 9.85% ***
2002
11 0.56 13.28% *** 13.23% *** 13.12% *** 13.00% ***
1995-2002 126 0.84 9.47% *** 9.50% *** 9.46% *** 9.49% ***
Fixed Price
Year
n
1995
8
1996
11
1997
14
1998
6
1999
14
2000
13
2001
9
2002
16
1995-2002 91

B
0.96
0.61
1.01
0.85
0.78
0.58
1.05
0.56
0.84

Market Model
Equal Wt
Value Wt
19.54% *** 19.67%
2.91%
2.93%
4.16% ** 4.13%
5.18% *** 4.66%
12.70% *** 13.08%
11.08% *** 10.67%
10.97% *** 10.35%
7.93% *** 7.59%
9.07% *** 8.92%

Open Market
Market Model
Year
n
B Equal Wt
Value Wt
1995
493 0.96 2.48% *** 2.47%
1996
691 0.61 2.41% *** 2.35%
1997
664 1.01 2.34% *** 2.24%
1998
647 0.85 3.45% *** 3.23%
1999
415 0.78 3.57% *** 3.72%
2000
320 0.58 4.20% *** 3.91%
2001
177 1.05 4.86% *** 3.74%
2002
399 0.56 3.29% *** 3.05%
1995-2002 3806 0.84 3.07% *** 2.91%
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***
**
**
***
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
19.52% *** 19.55%
2.86%
2.85%
4.11% ** 4.09%
5.22% *** 4.75%
12.65% *** 13.13%
11.21% *** 11.18%
11.39% *** .1079*
7.77% *** 7.53%
9.08% *** 9.01%
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
2.48% *** 2.45%
2.44% *** 2.33%
2.36% *** 2.03%
3.54% *** 3.24%
3.59% *** 3.75%
4.24% *** 4.01%
4.54% *** 3.95%
3.31% *** 3.07%
3.08% *** 2.90%

***
**
**
***
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Table 2- 8 Type of Repurchase (continued) Short-term (+2,+30) CARs
Dutch-Auction
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Year
n
B Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
1995
9 0.96 0.00%
0.94%
-0.17%
0.27%
1996
17 0.61 1.07%
0.13%
1.14%
-0.11%
1997
21 1.01 -5.83% * -3.10%
-7.42%
-4.71%
1998
24 0.85 3.01%
2.37%
3.95%
2.75%
1999
18 0.78 -4.71%
-0.45%
-3.96%
-0.46%
2000
17 0.58 13.47% * 10.55% * 12.36% * 10.04%
2001
9 1.05 4.36%
4.73%
4.44%
5.05%
2002
11 0.56 2.91%
2.47%
2.91%
2.82%
1995-2002 126 0.84 1.53%
1.93%
1.33%
1.64%
Fixed Price
Year
n
1995
8
1996
11
1997
14
1998
6
1999
14
2000
13
2001
9
2002
16
1995-2002 91

B
0.96
0.61
1.01
0.85
0.78
0.58
1.05
0.56
0.84

Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-7.04%
-5.82%
-6.64%
-6.40%
2.35%
0.90%
0.56%
-0.55%
4.55%
6.58%
4.58%
6.44%
-18.28% * -21.51% ** -20.68% ** -23.41% ***
-3.74%
-1.98%
-5.04%
-2.18%
-4.26%
-1.67%
-3.66%
-2.24%
-0.15%
0.34%
-1.25%
-0.58%
-0.39%
-0.87%
-0.14%
-0.68%
-2.24%
-1.47%
-2.62%
-2.01%

Open Market
Market Model
Year
n
B Equal Wt
Value Wt
1995
493 0.96 0.17%
0.49%
1996
691 0.61 0.89% *** 2.35%
1997
664 1.01 0.68%
0.61%
1998
645 0.85 3.59% *** 1.73%
1999
415 0.78 2.18%
4.89%
2000
320 0.58 2.93% *** 1.73%
2001
177 1.05 5.24%
6.47%
*
2002
399 0.56 1.93%
1.69%
1995-2002 3804 0.84 1.84% *** 1.73%
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***

***
**
**
***

Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
0.14%
0.11%
0.85% *** 0.55%
0.83%
-0.53%
3.78% *** 1.73%
2.10%
4.34%
3.05% *** 2.11%
5.81%
6.40%
*
1.96%
1.62%
1.92% *** 1.43%

*

***
**
**
***

Table 2- 8 Type of Repurchase (continued) Two-year post CARs
Dutch-Auction
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Year
n
B Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
1995
9 0.96 15.16%
9.84%
10.57%
2.50%
1996
17 0.61 29.08% *
2.99%
24.87% *
1.33%
1997
21 1.01 -25.93% ** -17.44% ** -44.54% ** -33.91%
1998
24 0.85 -3.08%
11.60%
-2.47%
10.84%
1999
18 0.78 21.38% * 52.79% *** 22.70% * 56.29%
2000
17 0.58 98.74% *** 86.99% *** 94.99% *** 85.17%
2001
9 1.05 -60.34% ** -25.52% * -66.22% ** -32.68%
2002
11 0.56 -15.43%
-7.76%
-9.11%
-5.06%
1995-2002 126 0.84 10.73% * 16.90% *
6.62%
13.19%
Fixed Price
Year
n
1995
8
1996
11
1997
14
1998
6
1999
14
2000
13
2001
9
2002
16
1995-2002 91

B
0.96
0.61
1.01
0.85
0.78
0.58
1.05
0.56
0.84

Open Market
Year
n
B
1995
493 0.96
1996
691 0.61
1997
664 1.01
1998
643 0.85
1999
415 0.78
2000
320 0.58
2001
177 1.05
2002
399 0.56
1995-2002 3802 0.84

***
***
***
**
*

Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-0.27%
-3.44%
-4.96%
-10.29%
47.80% *** 38.55% *** 45.09% *** 38.73% ***
30.24%
24.42%
28.38%
24.11%
22.99%
16.63%
25.85%
18.58%
9.60%
28.14% * 11.82%
33.77% **
61.40% *** 52.45% *** 62.76% *** 59.80% ***
16.55%
19.33%
19.69%
21.34%
-3.15%
8.45%
-7.07%
2.39%
23.33% *** 24.39% *** 22.63% *** 24.89% ***
Market Model
Equal Wt
Value Wt
20.32% *** 16.15%
25.58% *** 1.99%
-5.58% *** -14.52%
0.04% *** 24.41%
41.18% *** 66.57%
44.47% *** 26.75%
-22.96% *** -8.44%
-14.28% *** 0.56%
11.99% *** 13.23%
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***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

***

Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
19.59% *** 12.45%
24.87% *** 1.52%
-2.21% *** -30.87%
1.01% *** 22.15%
37.95% *** 64.43%
43.60% *** 33.09%
-19.77% *** -9.82%
-12.45% *** -2.07%
12.43% *** 9.37%

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Table 2- 8 Type of Repurchase (continued) Three-year CARs
Dutch-Auction
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Year
n
B Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
1995
9 0.96 17.32%
6.43%
11.92%
-4.68%
1996
17 0.61 12.60%
-21.98%
6.91%
-24.31%
1997
21 1.01 -37.61% *** -16.66% *** -62.20% *** -38.12%
1998
24 0.85 26.53% * 49.05% *** 28.88% ** 50.48%
1999
18 0.78 44.61% ** 93.86% *** 45.23% ** 98.89%
2000
17 0.58 138.77% *** 118.89% *** 132.27% *** 116.48%
2001
9 1.05 -79.17% *** -0.30% * -86.24% *** -40.78%
2002
11 0.56 -15.43%
-7.76%
-9.11%
-5.06%
1995-2002 126 0.84 19.62% ** 30.21% *** 14.02% ** 25.55%
Fixed Price
Year
n
1995
8
1996
11
1997
14
1998
6
1999
14
2000
13
2001
9
2002
16
1995-2002 91

B
0.96
0.61
1.01
0.85
0.78
0.58
1.05
0.56
0.84

Market Model
Equal Wt
Value Wt
17.51%
6.95%
45.69% *** 32.70%
17.03%
12.01%
22.90%
12.67%
24.95% ** 46.25%
69.43% *** 61.28%
28.34%
34.83%
-3.15%
8.45%
27.34% *** 28.02%

Open Market
Year
n
B
1995
493 0.96
1996
691 0.61
1997
664 1.01
1998
643 0.85
1999
415 0.78
2000
320 0.58
2001
177 1.05
2002
399 0.56
1995-2002 3802 0.84

Market Model
Equal Wt
Value Wt
38.74% *** 21.92%
25.11% *** -9.15%
-13.98% *** 14.58%
19.00% *** 52.11%
65.06% *** 103.45%
46.14% *** 26.00%
-36.28% *** -12.74%
-14.28% *** 0.56%
18.16% *** 20.39%
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**

***
***

***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
4.94%
-7.22%
38.89% *** 30.09%
13.35%
12.12%
23.69%
11.26%
29.64% ** 57.40%
68.63% *** 67.59%
34.57%
39.13%
-7.07%
2.39%
25.50% *** 28.34%
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
38.21% *** 16.59%
23.92% *** -9.76%
-8.48% *** -38.89%
19.47% *** 53.07%
58.69% *** 99.39%
45.69% *** 33.63%
-30.28% *** -0.15%
-12.45% *** -2.07%
18.64% *** 15.28%

*
***
***
***
**
**
***

**

***
***

***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Table 2-9 Market Reaction to Repurchase Announcements
Models 1 through 6 include 913 firms that announce open-market repurchases from 1995 to 2002.
Returnit = b0 + b1Xit + b2Year Indicators + eit. (t-statistics in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote
significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% levels).

A. Return for (-30, -2) Panel A is 1 of 2
Variable
(1)
(3)
(5)
(6)
Intercept -0.07482
-0.04384 * -0.05735 *** -0.04381 *
(-.81)
(-1.75)
(6.67)
(-1.69)
0.00014
0.00014
PrcBk-1 -0.00007
(0.42)
(0.43)
(-0.71)
EpsDil-1 0.03759
(0.41)
NI/assets -0.04718
(-0.63)
-0.07526 **
Share%
(-2.14)
-0.00128
StkVal
(-0.08)
-0.00057 **
-0.00057 **
IncGrow -0.00032
(-1.66) * (-2.25)
(-2.24)
0.00000
0.00000
EpsGrow
(0.32)
(0.25)
0.00034
MktVal
(0.97)
0.00039
BlkVal
(0.66)
0.00051
0.00050
Soptexer
(0.66)
(0.68)
0.00667
0.02134
0.01139
DumACQ 0.00598
(0.11)
(0.30)
(0.18)
(0.09)
0.01478
0.01877
0.01712
DumDIL 0.01781
(0.48)
(0.67)
(0.56)
(0.63)
-0.00762
-0.00630
-0.00664
DumEBP 0.00539
(-0.26)
(-0.22)
(-0.22)
(0.21)
-0.00148
-0.02299
-0.00185
DumESV -0.02367
(-0.07)
(-1.26)
(-0.09)
(-1.22)
0.04277 **
DumSTP 0.04380 ** 0.04167 ** 0.03036
(2.13)
(2.04)
(1.53)
(2.07)
DumUVL -0.08009 *** -0.11400 *** -0.08829 *** -0.11392 ***
(-4.21)
(-3.43)
(-4.19)
(-3.11)
-0.01310
Freq
(-0.69)
0.00623
Somefreq
(0.37)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Year
0.0365
0.0517
0.0121
0.0494
Adj. R2
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Table 2-9 (Continued)
Models 7 and 8 include 963 firms that announce open-market,
Dutch-auction or fixed-price repurchases from 1995 to 2002.
A. Return for (-30, -2) Panel A is 2 of 2.
Variable
(2)
(4)
(7)
(8)
Intercept -0.00872
-0.06282 ***
(-0.07)
(-2.76)
-0.00017
PrcBk_0 -0.00059
(-0.71)
(-0.52)
EpsDil_0 0.04454
(0.36)
-0.07525 **
Share%
(-2.04)
IncGrow -0.00049 **
(-2.27)
0.00000
EpsGrow
(0.38)
0.00028
MktVal
(0.81)
0.00052
Soptexer -0.00004
(-0.03)
(0.67)
DumACQ 0.00855
(0.12)
DumDIL 0.01317
(0.43)
DumEBP -0.00437
(-0.15)
DumESV -0.03493
(-1.60)
DumSTP 0.04245 **
(1.97)
DumUVL -0.08121 ***
(-2.87)
Yes
Yes
Year
2
Adj. R
0.0422
0.0144
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Table 2-9 (continued)
B. Return for (-1 +1) Panel B is 1 of 2
(1)
(3)
(5)
(6)
Variable
Intercept
-0.03232
0.00069
0.01572 *** -0.00184
(-0.83)
(0.06)
(4.50)
(-0.16)
PrcBk-1
-0.00001
-0.00019
-0.00019
(-0.18)
(-1.33)
(-1.34)
EpsDil-1
0.03675
(0.95)
NI/assets
-0.00686
(-0.22)
-0.01687
Share%
(-1.14)
StkVal
0.00135 *
(1.90)
IncGrow
-0.00009
-0.00007
-0.00006
(-1.13)
(-0.61)
(-0.52)
EpsGrow
0.00001 **
0.00001 **
MktVal
BlkVal
Soptexer
DumACQ
DumDIL
DumEBP
DumESV
DumSTP
DumUVL

-0.00008
(-0.56)
0.00004
(0.15)
0.00048
(1.45)
-0.01342
0.01246
(0.47)
(0.45)
-0.01188
-0.02039
(-0.99)
(-1.52)
-0.00812
-0.01216
(-0.93)
(-0.66)
0.01024 * 0.00831
(0.89)
(1.25)
-0.00019
-0.01008
(-0.02)
(-1.12)
0.00239
-0.00985
(0.22)
(-0.82)

0.00938
(0.32)
-0.00829
(-0.73)
-0.00449
(-0.39)
0.00718
(0.97)
-0.00389
(-0.48)
0.00015
(0.01)

Yes
-0.0062

No
-0.0041

Freq
Somefreq
Year
Adj. R2

Yes
0.0062
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0.00049
(1.07)
0.00908
(0.33)
-0.02241 *
(-1.65)
-0.01263
(-0.96)
0.00772
(0.82)
-0.01136
(-1.25)
-0.01064
(-0.89)
0.00641
(0.76)
0.00244
(0.33)
Yes
0.0052

Table 2-9 (continued)
B. Return for (-1 +1) Panel B is 2 of 2.
(2)
(4)
(7)
Variable
Intercept -0.00352
0.00384
0.00596
(-.007)
(0.39)
(0.53)
PrcBk_0
0.00004
-0.00019
(0.13)
(-1.34)
EpsDil_0 0.00529
(0.11)
Share%
-0.01509
(-1.01)
-0.00012
IncGrow -0.00012
(-1.33)
(-1.08)
EpsGrow
0.00001 ** 0.00000

(8)
0.01180
(1.29)

MktVal

-0.00004
(-0.30)
Soptexer
0.00001 * 0.00049
(1.69)
(1.46)
DumACQ 0.01274
(0.44)
DumDIL -0.01956
(-1.60)
DumEBP -0.00823
(-0.64)
DumESV 0.01963 **
(2.22)
DumSTP -0.00182
(-0.21)
DumUVL 0.00026
(0.02)
Freq
Somefreq
DA
FP
Year
Adj. R2

Yes
0.0002

Yes
0.0052

0.00039
(1.16)
0.00983
0.01381
(0.35)
(0.47)
-0.01793
-0.00754 *
(-1.30)
(-0.65)
-0.01211
-0.00395
(-0.91)
(-0.34)
0.00512
0.00745
(0.56)
(0.97)
-0.00960
-0.00324
(-1.05)
(-0.39)
-0.00405
0.00470
(-0.34)
(0.44)
0.01
(0.77)
0.00
(0.06)
0.07 *** 0.06122 ***
(5.11)
(4.69)
-0.02
-0.01425
(-0.68)
(-0.48)
Yes
Yes
0.0390
0.0139
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Table 2-9 (continued)
C. Return for (+2 +30) Panel C is 1 of 2
(1)
(3)
(5)
(6)
Variable
Intercept
-0.05920
0.00274
0.01746 ** 0.01165
(-0.77)
(0.14)
(2.44)
(0.56)
PrcBk-1
-0.00004 -0.00089 ***
-0.00088
(-0.49)
(-3.45)
(-3.44) ***
EpsDil-1
0.05954
(0.78)
NI/assets
0.06832
(1.11)
0.00731
Share%
(0.25)
StkVal
0.00247 *
(1.77)
IncGrow
-0.00019
0.00041 **
0.00037 *
(-1.20)
(2.01)
(1.82)
EpsGrow
0.00000
0.00001
(0.57)
(0.97)
MktVal
0.00058
(0.20)
BlkVal
-0.00007
(-0.15)
Soptexer
-0.00053
-0.00063
(-0.96)
(-1.04)
DumACQ 0.00179
0.01022
0.00542
0.02843
(0.03)
(0.20)
(0.09)
(0.57)
DumDIL -0.01649 -0.00534
-0.02721
0.00491
(-0.70)
(-0.22)
(-1.16)
(0.20)
DumEBP -0.02076 -0.01848
-0.01060
-0.01550
(-0.77)
(-0.44)
(-0.65)
(-0.87)
DumESV -0.00223
0.00829
0.00542
0.00986
(0.49)
(0.36)
(0.58)
(-0.14)
DumSTP
0.01879
0.00397
0.02073
0.00996
(1.11)
(0.24)
(1.26)
(0.61)
DumUVL 0.01361
0.02833
0.01873
0.03119
(0.64)
(1.30)
(0.87)
(1.44)
Freq
-0.04007 ***
(-2.64)
Somefreq
-0.00017
(-0.01)
Year
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
2
Adj. R
-0.0009
0.0452
-0.0021
0.0572

73

Table 2-9 (continued)
C. Return for (+2 +30) Panel C is 2 of 2.
(2)
(4)
(7)
(8)
Variable
Intercept -0.01616
0.00549
-0.00635
0.00638
(-0.16)
(0.31)
(-0.16)
(0.23)
PrcBk_0 0.00058
-0.00078 ***
(0.85)
(-3.07)
EpsDil_0 -0.01730
(-0.17)
Share%
0.00372
(0.12)
0.00026
IncGrow -0.00007
(-0.39)
(0.68)
EpsGrow
0.00000
0.00000
(0.54)
(0.28)
MktVal
0.00018
(0.67)
Soptexer 0.00103 *** -0.00055
0.00039
(0.91)
(-0.90)
(-0.33)
DumACQ 0.00401
-0.00125
-0.00343
(0.07)
(-0.01)
(-0.04)
DumDIL -0.01632
-0.00955
-0.02943
(-0.65)
(-0.20)
(-0.82)
DumEBP -0.01894
-0.04501
-0.02623
(-0.73)
(-0.98)
(-0.72)
DumESV 0.00220
-0.03871
-0.01688
(0.12)
(-1.22)
(-0.72)
DumSTP 0.00817
-0.01210
0.01125
(0.46)
(-0.38)
(0.45)
DumUVL 0.00529
0.00080
0.00735
(0.02)
(0.23)
(0.23)
Freq
0.00173
(0.06)
Somefreq
0.02599
(1.03)
DA
0.20396 *** 0.18427 ***
(4.53)
(4.59)
FP
0.17624 * 0.17596 *
(1.79)
(1.94)
Year
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adj. R2
-0.0016
0.0419
0.0376
0.0220
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Table 2-9 (continued)
D. Return for (+30 Two years) Panel D is 1 of 2
(1)
(3)
(5)
Variable
Intercept -0.13381
-0.01625
0.12715 ***
(-0.74)
(-0.12)
(2.97)
PrcBk-1
0.00051
0.00190
(1.10)
(1.15)
EpsDil-1 0.41952
(0.93)
NI/assets -0.62612 *
(-1.71)
0.35803 **
Share%
(2.08)
StkVal
0.01030
(1.25)
IncGrow -0.00409 *** -0.00668 ***
(-4.34)
(-5.25)
EpsGrow
0.00002
(0.42)
MktVal
-0.00123
(-0.72)
BlkVal
-0.00115
(-0.40)
Soptexer
-0.00353
(-0.93)
DumACQ -0.20677
-0.26211
-0.24351
(-0.62)
(-0.84)
(-0.69)
DumDIL -0.14856
-0.25748
-0.28589 **
(-1.07)
(-1.68)
(-2.05)
DumEBP -0.04357
0.04580
0.09425
(0.31)
(0.66)
(-0.31)
DumESV -0.09432
-0.01325
-0.14440
(-0.12)
(-1.58)
(-0.99)
DumSTP 0.24495 ** 0.25132 *** 0.22910 **
(2.57)
(2.45)
(2.33)
DumUVL -0.08316
-0.06036
-0.13960
(-0.66)
(-0.44)
(-1.09)
Freq
Somefreq
Year
Adj. R2

Yes
0.0816

Yes
0.1253

No
0.0097
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(6)
-0.01137
(-0.08)
0.00189
(1.15)

-0.00669 ***
(-5.23)
0.00002
(0.42)

-0.00353
(-0.93)
-0.26028
(-0.82)
-0.25591 *
(-1.66)
0.04574
(0.31)
-0.01168
(-0.11)
0.25270 **
(2.44)
-0.05890
(-0.43)
0.00067
(0.01)
-0.01090
(-0.13)
Yes
0.1224

Table 2-9 (continued)
D. Return for (+30 Two years) Panel D is 2 of 2.
(2)
(4)
(7)
Variable
Intercept
PrcBk_0
EpsDil_0
Share%
IncGrow
EpsGrow
MktVal
Soptexer
DumACQ
DumDIL
DumEBP
DumESV
DumSTP
DumUVL

-0.50772
-0.09659
(-0.82)
(-0.81)
0.00202
0.00088
(0.50)
(0.53)
0.60061
(1.01)
0.34833 *
(1.95)
-0.00456 ***
(-4.33)
0.00002
(0.46)
-0.00057
(-0.33)
0.00232
-0.00316
(0.35)
(-0.81)
-0.23201
(-0.67)
-0.29160 **
(-1.99)
-0.04190
(-0.27)
0.11796
(-1.11)
0.20114 *
(1.93)
-0.06279
(-0.46)

Freq
Somefreq
DA
FP
Year
Adj. R2

Yes
0.0754

Yes
0.0842

-0.02546
(-0.19)

(8)
-0.01469
(-0.13)

-0.00613 ***
(-4.82)
0.00002
(0.63)

-0.00390
(-1.01)
-0.26787
-0.22517
(-0.83)
(-0.65)
-0.28226 * -0.26150 *
(-1.81)
(-1.91)
0.02893
0.04388
(0.19)
(0.32)
-0.04740
-0.09898
(-0.46)
(-1.09)
0.22129 ** 0.16910 *
(2.13)
(1.75)
-0.06986
-0.19176
(-0.51)
(-1.53)
0.00320
(0.03)
0.03316
(0.40)
0.12428
0.16774
(0.84)
(1.08)
-0.04013
0.10648
(-0.12)
(0.31)
Yes
Yes
0.1212
0.0534
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Table 2-9 (continued)
E. Return for (+30 Three years) Panel E is 1 of 2
(1)
(3)
(5)
Variable
Intercept -0.84043
0.05133
0.20817 ***
(-1.47)
(0.30)
(3.78)
PrcBk-1
0.00004
0.00455 **
(0.06)
(2.17)
EpsDil-1 0.99994 *
(1.76)
NI/assets -0.81467 *
(-1.77)
0.39822 *
Share%
(1.84)
StkVal
0.00361
(0.35)
IncGrow -0.00490 *** -0.00455 **
(-4.13)
(-2.39)
EpsGrow
-0.00539 ***
(-3.63)
MktVal
-0.00244
(-1.13)
BlkVal
0.00059
(0.16)
Soptexer
-0.00632
(-1.30)
DumACQ -0.44883 *** -0.54254
-0.54550
(-1.07)
(-1.36)
(-1.20)
DumDIL -0.24654 ** -0.38236 * -0.38534 **
(-1.40)
(-1.71)
(-2.16)
DumEBP 0.07503
0.10720
0.27925
(0.56)
(1.53)
(0.42)
DumESV -0.12850
-0.07849
-0.19422 *
(-0.58)
(-1.66)
(-1.07)
DumSTP 0.34207 *** 0.27753 ** 0.33184 ***
(2.70)
(2.13)
(2.64)
DumUVL -0.06817
-0.06211
-0.11837
(-0.43)
(-0.36)
(-0.72)
Freq
Somefreq
Year
Adj. R2

Yes
0.07560

Yes
0.12420

No
0.01560

77

(6)
0.08689
(0.50)
0.00452 **
(2.15)

-0.00460 **
(-2.42)
-0.00550 ***
(-3.69)

-0.00638
(-1.32)
-0.53149
(-1.32)
-0.32085
(-1.63)
0.10691
(0.56)
-0.06694
(-0.49)
0.28678 **
(2.18)
-0.05082
(-0.29)
0.00949
(0.08)
-0.08198
(-0.75)
Yes
0.12240

Table 2-9 (continued)
E. Return for (+30 Three years) Panel E is 2 of 2.
(2)
(4)
(7)
Variable
Intercept -0.89011
0.00417
0.09190
(-1.13)
(0.03)
(0.53)
PrcBk_0 -0.00027 *** 0.00430 **
(-0.05)
(2.06)
EpsDil_0 1.03764
(1.36)
Share%
0.41224 *
(1.80)
-0.00432 **
IncGrow -0.00568 ***
(-4.24)
(-2.31)
EpsGrow
-0.00720 *** -0.00438 ***
(-5.69)
(-3.21)
MktVal
-0.00152
(-0.71)
Soptexer -0.00558
-0.00636
-0.07150
(-0.66)
(-1.31)
(-1.47)
DumACQ -0.49438
-0.50009
(-1.12)
(-1.23)
DumDIL -0.40336 **
-0.37268 *
(-2.16)
(-1.88)
DumEBP 0.08885
0.09630
(0.46)
(0.51)
DumESV -0.15604
-0.08623
(-1.15)
(-0.64)
DumSTP 0.28975 **
0.27379 **
(2.18)
(2.09)
DumUVL -0.04656
-0.05351
(-0.31)
(-0.27)
Freq
-0.04723
(-0.40)
Somefreq
-0.02409
(-0.23)
DA
-0.03018
(-0.14)
FP
-0.14752
(-0.29)
Year
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adj. R2
0.06820
0.11180
0.10570
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(8)
0.00902
(0.06)

-0.48365
(-1.10)
-0.37950 **
(-2.183)
0.19319
(1.09)
-0.13244
(-1.14)
0.25864 **
(2.11)
-0.20479
(-1.29)

-0.00015
(0.00)
0.01255
(0.02)
Yes
0.04820

Chapter 3
Why do firms repurchase stock to acquire another firm?

In chapter 2, I suggest that using a repurchase to fund an acquisition may be an
opportunistic motivation. This categorization was based on the hubris hypothesis of why
we continue to see poor stock returns associated with mergers.45 This chapter investigates
the enigmatic decision by a firm to take on the extra transactional step to repurchase its
shares with cash and then use those shares to finance an acquisition, rather than use the
cash to directly finance the acquisition. It would seem to be far easier, if a firm has the
cash available, to acquire the target firm with the cash. This is even more of an enigma
when it is well known that cash offerings perform better than stock offerings.46
I find that firms that repurchase shares to finance an acquisition are well
compensated for their efforts, The most compelling argument as to why firms would take
on the extra financing step is to achieve the best of both the stock-financing acquisitions
and cash-financing acquisitions. These firms experience risk sharing with the target
firms, counteract the negative effects of dilution by repurchasing shares first, and enjoy a
tax advantage for their efforts.
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Roll, 1986, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
Martin, 1986, The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment Opportunities, and
Management Ownership.
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The organization of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first part discusses
merger and acquisition literature. The second section develops the hypotheses and
methodology. The third section reports the empirical findings and the last section
summarizes and concludes the chapter.

Literature
Takeovers can occur through mergers, tender offers, or proxy contests. This
research focuses on mergers, which are generally stock-financed, and tender offers,
which are generally cash-financed. Mergers are negotiated directly with the target
managers and require approval from the target firm’s board of directors. Tender offers are
offers to buy shares made directly to target shareholders, bypassing the target managers.
This research will also investigate the method of payment choice. Specifically, the
research asks why firms would choose to repurchase their shares with cash and then use
those shares to finance an acquisition, rather than use cash to finance the acquisition
directly.
Several hypotheses have been put forth to help explain the market’s behavior
toward mergers and acquisitions. Myers and Majluf (1984), in their seminal paper that
develops pecking order, address the benefits of financial slack. Convention assumes
managers should accept all positive net present value (NPV) projects. However, if a firm
can only issue risky debt, the firm may rationally pass up on positive NPV projects.
Having financial slack enables the firm to take all positive NPV projects. Thus, firms
with financial slack will issue stock only when their stock is overvalued. As a result, the
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equity offering may send a signal that managers believe that their stock is overvalued.
Thus, consistent with the Cash Availability Hypothesis, firms with financial slack will
prefer to finance an acquisition with cash if their stock is undervalued.
In a similar vein to the Cash Availability Hypothesis, the Investment
Opportunities Hypothesis argues that managers with growth opportunities will prefer to
raise capital with equity because it allows more flexibility in the use of funds than debt
financing.47 Martin (1996) tests this hypothesis with three proxies for investment
opportunity (Tobin’s q, five-years sales growth and the recent run-up of the firm’s stock
price) and finds that both acquiring firms with high growth opportunity and the firms
with recent stock price run-ups are more likely to use stock.
The Control Hypothesis argues that firms with large managerial ownership
positions should prefer to use cash to finance an acquisition because the alternative would
dilute the managers’ control position.48 Martin (1996) suggests that managerial
ownership may be nonlinear on the choice of stock financing. At very low and high
ownership levels managers may not be very concerned about the impact of dilution of
control. However, the middle range may be very concerned. Martin uses a spline variable
approach to define the ownership levels. Low ownership groups have less than five
percent manager and director combined ownership; the middle range is defined as greater
than five percent and less than 25 percent and the high owner firms have greater than 25
percent manager and director control. Martin’s sample of 721 firms found 425 in the low
47

Myers (1977) ties existence of growth opportunities to debt. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jung, Kim,
and Stulz (1995) put forth this hypothesis.
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group, 299 in the middle range and 125 in the high ownership group.49 Martin found that
the low ownership group was not significant and he suggests that managers with low
ownership were not concerned with dilution effects. Martin found that the middle range
considered ownership important (significantly negative relationships in three of his four
logistic regressions which suggest that the firm is not likely to use stock financing).
Finally, Martin found the high ownership group to be significantly negative in one of four
regressions, substantiating his nonlinear choice of stock financing.
Martin (1996) uses the Risk Sharing Hypothesis to suggest that as target firms’
size increase (as measured by market value) and the addition of target firms to bidder
firms becomes more significant, the bidder will prefer to use stock in order to share the
risk with the target. On the other hand, if the acquiring firm’s size is significantly larger
than the target firm, the acquirer will be less likely to feel the need to share risk since the
target will not have as much an impact to the combined firm. In this case, the bidder will
be less likely to use stock. Hansen (1987) models the payment choice under the condition
of asymmetric information. If the target knows its value better than the bidder, the bidder
will prefer stock in order to force the target to share in the post-acquisition reevaluation
effects. Martin’s initial investigation finds no support. Martin refines his test by
establishing four distant groups of firms; both the bidder and target firms have high
Tobin’s q ratios (q>1), both firms have low q ratios (q<1), and groups of one firm high q
and one firm low q. Martin finds that 68 percent of firms choose stock financing and only
48

Stulz (1988) and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1995) suggest that managers will not want issue stock if in doing
so will dilute their control position. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) find evidence to support the control
hypothesis.
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16 percent choose cash if both the bidder and target have high investment opportunities.
Furthermore, if both the parties have low investment opportunities, then only 26 percent
use stock financing and 42 percent use cash financing50.
The Outside Monitoring Hypothesis is suggested by Jensen (1991) and Black
(1992). They argue that active investors and institutional shareholders undertake costly
monitoring and thus can take actions to align managers’ interests with those of the
shareholders. Martin (1996) finds support in that the presence of blockholders and
institutional holders results in a higher likelihood of stock financing.
Another argument supporting stock-financed acquisitions was put forth by
Aboody, Kasznik and Williams (2000). They suggest that managers of acquiring firms
should prefer pooling versus purchasing accounting because purchase accounting
requires the firm to book as an asset the difference between the purchase price of the
acquisition and the book value of the target firm. This asset is expensed into the future.
This additional expense dampens net income and earning per share for years to come. As
an aside, the authors did not address the positive tax consequences of these future
expenses, but instead focused attention on the negative impacts of the publicly reported
earnings.51 Aboody, Kasznik, and Williams suggest that because managerial incentive
contracts are often tied to net income and earnings per share, managers should prefer
pooling accounting. However, pooling accounting cannot be accomplished in conjunction
49

This cutoff choice is consistent with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Furthermore Martin (1995)
performed robustness checks on percentage changes with the groups and found little difference.
50
Martin’s findings are in a total sample in which 40 percent of firms use stock financing and 35 percent
cash.
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with an acquiring firm repurchasing its shares. APBO No. 16 prohibits changes in equity
interests of voting stock with pooling accounting.52 Therefore, firms cannot repurchase
shares and then use those shares to pool assets with a target firm. The authors conclude
that although managers should prefer pooling assets in stock for stock acquisitions, the
transaction cannot be supported with the acquiring firm’s repurchase of its own shares.
Aboody, Kasznik and Williams (2000) also argue that managers should prefer
pooling. However, this might be shortsighted by the managers. Goodwill is created when
a firm purchases another firm (or assets of another firm) for greater than its market value.
The difference between the fair market value and the amount paid is considered goodwill.
Historically, financial statement reporting for a purchase of another firm books goodwill
as an asset and the goodwill is amortized for up to 40 years. On the other hand, when
firms merge through pooling accounting, no goodwill is created. The combined firms
simply add previously recorded book values together. Thus, for financial statement
reporting the purchase accounting results in higher booked assets and thus higher
amortization expenses. This decreases the combined firms reported earnings and lowers
earning per share; thus most mangers would seek to meet the criteria of pooling
accounting.
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Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code; subtitle A; Chapter 1; Subchapter B; Part VI; section 197 effective
August 1993 states that a taxpayer is entitled to an amortization deduction for goodwill over a period of up
to 15 years.
52
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16 (August 1070) establishes 12 specific criteria that most be
met in order to qualify for pooling accounting. These 12 criteria include the use of exchange of common
stock (90% “substantially all” rule); no equity changes in contemplation of combination (two-year rule) and
shares can be reacquired only for purposes other than business combination. If any criteria are not met, the
purchase method must be used.
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Financial statement reporting and tax code reporting can be different. For most of
the US tax code history, amortization of goodwill was not a tax-deductible expense. Thus
mangers were justifiably reluctant to inherit the appearance of lower earnings per share
that resulted with purchase accounting. However, effective August 1993, section 127 of
the US tax code regarding amortization of goodwill and other intangibles changed to
allow taxpayers the amortization deduction. Although there have been recent changes
regarding purchase versus pooling accounting, these changes do not affect the section
127 tax code53. Since 1993 acquiring firms’ managers who chose purchase accounting
received a tax benefit (reduction in taxes payable due to increase in amortizable
deductions). Although the purchase method does have the appearance of lower earnings
per share; in reality the purchase method through its real tax benefit affords higher cash
flows to the purchasing firm. My sample of firms falls under this tax code.
As an example, lets assume that a firm used purchase accounting with the
acquisition of another firm. A very simple income statement might look like the
following:
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SFAS No. 141, Business Combinations, issued on 7-20-01 requires that the purchase method of
accounting be used for all business combinations initiated after 6-30-01. This new purchase accounting
method does not allow for goodwill amortization for financial reporting. Instead companies will recognize
goodwill as an asset on financial statements and present it as a separate item on the balance sheet.
Companies will then conduct an annual impairment test and goodwill will remain on the balance sheet as
an asset subject to impairment. Some effects of this change may be that companies will no longer worry
about structuring a deal in order to comply with pooling, goodwill will be more reflective of value and not
a system of arbitrary amortization, and impairment charges could be costly and bumpy The new standards
for goodwill accounting should contribute to more meaningful financial statements, improved transparency
and greater consistency among companies. Three drawbacks are the lack of an international convergence,
inconsistency with the existing tax code where goodwill remains amortizable, and the removal of the
discipline of writing off goodwill which allows for more management discretion.
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Thus, net income and earnings per share are greater under pooling accounting. However,
depreciation is a non-cash expense and as a matter of fact the sources of cash are greater
with purchasing. Therefore, a more insightful manager might realize the tax savings of
the purchase accounting will add value to the company’s cash flows. Additionally, this is
what should matter to the investors. Thus, purchase accounting can be beneficial due to
the tax advantage. Normally, purchase accounting is conducted with cash. However, if a
firm believes its stock is undervalued and if the firm also has ample cash flow, managers
may be able to avail themselves of the best of both worlds. They can first take advantage
of their undervalued stock by announcing a repurchase and then use that stock to support
an acquisition and by APBO No. 16 be forced to use purchase accounting which will save
the firm future taxes. This scenario gives a strong argument for why firms would take on
extra transactions in order to acquire another firm. They proceed with this method to take
advantage of undervalued stock and to reduce the firm’s future tax burden.
Most research on mergers and acquisitions finds that, on average, target firms
gain value and the bidder firms lose value.54 For example, Travlos (1987) explores the

54

Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988, find average returns to bidders are non-positive. Lang, Stulz, and
Walkling, 1989, find that having a low Tobin’s Q (proxy for poor quality of bidding firm management)
reduces the bidder’s return (see also Servaes, 1991). Dennis and McConnell, 1986, investigate firms’ senior
securities and find that the bidder firm’s convertible preferred stockholders have significantly positive
returns while all other security holders are not significantly different from zero. Jensen and Ruback, 1983,
provide summary of the literature.
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Method of Payment Hypothesis and finds that bidders who use stock have significant
negative abnormal returns while bidders who make cash offers experience normal
returns. Specifically, Travlos finds that bidders using stock have significant negative
stock price return reaction of -0.78 percent on the day prior to the announcement and 0.67 percent on the day of the announcement. Travlos concludes that, on average,
stockholders of acquiring firms experience significant losses when their firm acquires
another firm through the exchange of common stock. In contrast, bidders using cash
offers have a positive two-day (-1,0) significant cumulative abnormal return reaction of
0.24 percent. Travlos suggests that his findings are consistent with the Signaling
Hypothesis. He explains that firms signal overvaluation if they finance a takeover with
stock. Thus, managers will prefer cash if they believe their stock is undervalued, while a
stock-financed offer will be preferred in the opposite case. Accordingly, the market
participants respond favorably to cash offers and negatively to stock offers. If a firm
announces that it will repurchase its own shares prior to or in conjunction with an
acquisition announcement, then the market participants are not likely to perceive that the
firm is overvalued. In fact the market should conclude quite the opposite.
Taxes may have an important impact on stock price reactions of the bidding and
target firms. Cash offers generate tax obligations for the target firm’s stockholders.
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1987) suggest that bidding firms will pay a higher premium in
a cash offer to compensate a target firm's shareholders for their tax burden of tendering
shares. Thus, the target firm’s gain may simply be compensation for its upcoming tax
burden. Again it should be noted that the firm using repurchased shares as the financing
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vehicle would not have to offer the bidder firm additional compensation for the target’s
tax consequences. However, it should be noted that the bidder’s shareholders may suffer
a capital gains tax loss from tendering shares.
A cash offer affects the taxes of the acquiring firms by raising the depreciation
basis of acquired assets to the assets market values. This is advantageous to increasing
the firm's expenses and decreasing the firm's tax liability, but also has the effect of
reducing booked net income, which may have perceived adverse effects to the market
participants. Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) investigate the gains to bidder firms and
find significant positive stock price returns of 6.17 percent for an 81-day period
surrounding a cash acquisition announcement and a zero gain for stock acquisitions. The
authors suggest that the offer to the target reflects the bidder’s expectations of the target’s
value. Alternatively, if the bidder believes that the target is overvalued the bidder will
choose to finance with stock and if the bidders believes the target is undervalued the
bidder will prefer cash55.
Servaes (1991) and Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) also explore the takeover
gains. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling document that abnormal returns in tender offers are
related to Tobin's q (high q is defined as q>1 and low as q<1) and find that bidders with
high q ratios have significant positive abnormal returns and low q bidders have
significant negative returns. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling find the highest value is created
when a high q firm takes over a low q firm and the value is destroyed when a low q firm
takes over a high q firm. Servaes adds to the research of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling with
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the addition of merger offers in his extended sample of 704 successful takeovers over the
period 1972-1987. Servaes finds for the total sample that target returns are positive
(23.64 percent) and significant, bidder negative (-1.07 percent) and total returns positive
(3.66 percent). Servaes splits his sample based on the method of payment and finds that a
cash offer results in a 26.67 percent return to the target firm, 3.44 percent return to the
bidder and an 8.41 percent to the combined firm (calculated as a weighted average). He
finds that a stock-financed acquisition, on average, results in a 20.47 percent return to the
target firm, a -5.86 percent to the bidder, and a -3.03 percent to the combined firm.
Finally, a combined stock and cash offer results in a 21.05 percent return to the target, a 3.74 percent return to the bidder, and 5.64 to the combined firm.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) investigate why returns to bidding firms are
negative and find that returns are most negative when the firm acquires another firm as a
diversification, when it acquires a growing firm, or if it has poor management. Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny suggest that managers make acquisitions to pursue personal
objectives other than maximization of shareholder value. Thus, managers are willing to
pay more for targets than they are worth if the acquisition will serve their personal
benefits of improving their job security or diversifying their human capital. Loughran and
Vijh (1997) calculate the total wealth gains for mergers and acquisitions and find that all
returns to the bidder in a stock merger are negative (and cash is positive). Specifically,
Loughran and Vijh find that stock acquirers earn 24.2 percent less than their matched
firms, on average, using buy and hold returns over a five-year period; whereas cash
acquirers earn 18.5 percent more than their matched firms. Loughran and Vijh suggest
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that cash tender offers obtain considerable gains because of the associated disciplinary
actions afforded to the cash acquisition, such as the ability to appoint new managers. Rau
and Vermaelen (1998) investigate long-term bidder performance and find that bidders in
mergers underperform for up to three-years after the merger is complete.
Rather than explaining the persistent negative and positive stock price reactions to
acquisitions as a method of payment issue, Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2004) show
that the primary determinant of long-term performance in strategic mergers is related to
changes in corporate focus. The authors find that the change in focus is significantly
related to performance after controlling for the form of payment56, and firm value ratios
such as book-to-market ratio.57 The authors find that focus-decreasing mergers as defined
by the Herfindahl index which quantifies the revenue changes of each line of business
(SIC codes)58, result in significantly negative long-term performance.59 Furthermore
Megginson, Morgan and Nail find that increasing or at least preserving the focus of the
firm’s lines of business result in marginal long-term performance improvements.
Megginson, Morgan and Nail’s regression results reveal that their measure of focus
change is the only variable with significant relationships to long-term buy-and-hold
abnormal returns.
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Loughran and Vijh (1997), Ghosh (2001), Linn and Switzer (2001). and Martin (1996)
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Martin (1996)
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The degree of focus is found using the Herfindahl index for both revenue and assets. This looks at square
of revenue (assets) of each division divided by the total revenue. Thus, the revenue of division A is divided
by the revenue of the entire firm and then squared.
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Megginson etal find an average loss in stockholder wealth, firm value and cash flows of 18 percent, 9
percent and 2 percent respectively for up to three years post-merger.
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Sicherman and Pettway (1987) find that buyers of divested assets gain wealth if
the firms have related assets as defined by their two digit SIC codes. The authors studied
127 firms that acquired divested assets from 1893-1985 and found that related asset
acquisitions resulted in an average 3.975 percent gain over firms that acquired unrelated
divested assets. Sicherman and Pettway add that shareholders obtain higher returns when
the acquirer purchases related lines of business. They further investigate how insider
ownership affects the choice of relatedness.
Copeland and Weston (1988) discuss that managers may be motivated to acquire
unrelated assets in order to reduce personal risk. A substantial portion of the manager’s
wealth is invested as human capital from employment. Thus, purchasing a divested
unrelated line or simply diversifying the firm’s assets helps reduce the manager’s
employment assets, which reduces personal risk. Sicherman and Pettway use insider
ownership as a percentage of total ownership and find that firms acquiring related assets
have a greater equity ownership than firms acquiring unrelated assets. Thus, firms that
have high manager ownership are more likely to act in the shareholders’ best interests,
whereas low ownership managers may be motivated to be more self-serving and prefer to
reduce their own risk.
Many studies note this effect. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that bidder
results are slightly negative and the combined firm’s returns are positive. Thus, targets
appear to be worth less than bidders pay, but are worth more than the target’s market
value prior to the takeover, suggesting that the acquisition increases the combined
shareholder wealth. Kaplan and Weisbach focus on 1971-1982 acquisitions that later
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divested and classify some as successful. Although the emphasis of their paper is to show
that not all firms that acquire another firm and then later divest are unsuccessful, they
discovered an interesting outcome, showing that the market’s initial reaction to the
acquisition did a good job predicting whether the later divestiture was a success or not.
They define an unsuccessful acquisition as one that reports an accounting loss at the later
date’s divestiture. Kaplan and Weisbach find that the combined returns at the acquisition
announcement are significantly lower for the acquisitions that will, in hindsight, be
classified as unsuccessful as compared to the corresponding returns for the successful
divestitures and for the acquisitions that do not divest.
Although it has been substantiated that bidders often lose in an acquisition,
merger activity continues. Roll (1986) explains this acquisition fever in his hubris
hypothesis. In summary, the hubris hypothesis suggests that managers are infected by
hubris and so overpay for targets because they overestimate their own ability to run the
merged firm.60 Furthermore, managers believe that they are better at estimating valuation
than the merger evidence would indicate. Additionally, Jensen (1986) and others have
noted that managers may want to increase the firm’s size because they value the status
associated with a larger firm and furthermore their compensation may be tied to the size
of the firm. Thus, managers do not want to reduce firm size by distributing assets to
shareholders (see Roll (1986)). Managers are more concerned with growth in market
share, in labor employment and in new lines of business than in maximizing shareholder
wealth (see Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Thus, managers are more concerned with size

92

and things money cannot buy, such as perks, prestige and future employment, than they
are with maximizing the value of the firm.61
This desire to empire-build (see Roll (1986)) may lead to the acceptance of
negative net present value projects; that is, managers may overinvest. Since managers are
risk averse, they will not choose to increase their debt to the point of risking bankruptcy.
Thus, rational self-serving managers will not want to increase interest payments and
commitment levels in order to empire build; however, they will be more likely to make
poor investment choices when free cash flow is available and bankruptcy is less likely.
Poor investments could be carried out with cash or stock financing. If the firm chooses to
use stock financing, managers may also conduct repurchasing activities to finance the
stock-based acquisition. Thus, a repurchase in order to conduct an acquisition may signal
an empire-building strategy and would not necessarily be good news to the market.
Furthermore, stock-financed acquisitions have been shown to decrease the value of the
acquiring firm.62 Thus, firms that repurchase to facilitate an acquisition may find that the
market reactions to the repurchase announcements are similar to non-positive market
reactions to acquisition announcements.
Repurchasing stock in order to finance an acquisition creates one more step in the
empire-building firm strategy. There are costs associated with this extra step (time lost
and transaction fees) and therefore it would seem that there must be a benefit. It is likely
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1988, suggest that managers willingly overpay for an acquisition to improve their
job security.
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Graham and Harvey, 1999, survey 392 chief financial officers and find that executives are not concerned
about many financial theories such as asset substitution, free cash flows or asymmetric information, but
rather are concerned with earning per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation.
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Loughran and Vijh, 1997, and Travlos, 1987.
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that both the signaling hypothesis and tax hypothesis play an important role in the
financing plan. Firms that repurchase shares may signal undervaluation and firms that use
stock to finance the acquisition in this situation must use purchase accounting. And
although purchase accounting will reduce the book value of earnings per share, it also
will reduce the firm’s taxes and thus increase its cash flows.

Prediction, Data and Methodology
Hypotheses
In my previous chapter I suggest that an opportunistic reason for a repurchase is
to fund an acquisition, and thus positive stock price reactions may not be anticipated.
Based on previous research,63 if a repurchase is conducted in order to finance an
acquisition it may also carry with it the poor stock return reactions that have been
associated with bidder firms conducting acquisitions. However, researchers have made a
clear distinction between cash-financed acquisitions and stock-financed acquisitions. If a
firm uses cash to repurchase shares which are then used to acquire a target firm, this is
not straight cash or straight stock-financed. Many researchers have documented losses to
bidding firms that use stock. The use of repurchased shares to conduct an acquisition is
stock-financed and may result in the negative abnormal returns associated with stockfinanced acquisitions. On the other hand, using repurchased stock to finance an
acquisition is just adding a step to a cash-financed acquisition and thus may act according
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Travlos, 1987; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Loughran and Vijh, 1987; and Rau and Vermaelen,
1982.
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to previous research and have no negative abnormal returns or possibly slightly positive
returns.
Additionally, using a repurchase to facilitate an acquisition begs further
investigation. Why would a firm go through such transactional gymnastics? It would be
simpler and less costly in time and dollars to just conduct an acquisition with cash.64
Therefore, there must be some benefit to taking on this additional cost. It may be that the
premium to acquire is less with a stock-financed acquisition than with a cash-financed
acquisition for the bidding firm will not need to compensate the target firm for its
immediate tax consequences. 65
It is possible that the repurchase announcement gives managers the anticipated
positive stock price return reaction which more than offsets the anticipated decrease in
stock price with an acquisition announcement. In a sense, this may extinguish the
negative return reactions associated with a straight stock offering and allow bidder
managers to pay a smaller premium at the acquisition. If this is the case, I expect that
these firms may have better long-term performance than firms that do not take the extra
transactional step since they would be less likely to overpay for the acquisition. 66
Finally, purchasing accounting does carry a long term tax advantage. Normally
stock offered acquisitions do not use purchase accounting. However, if the firm uses
64

Loughran, Tim, and Anand M Vijh, 1997, Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit From Corporate
Acquisitions?, Journal of Finance 52, 1765-1790. During a five-year period following the acquisition, on
average, firms that complete stock mergers earn significantly negative excess returns of -25.0 percent
whereas firms that complete cash tender offers earn significantly positive excess returns of 61.7 percent.
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Martin, 1996, finds that the higher the bidding firm’s investment opportunity set the more likely the firm
will choose to use stock financing.
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Roll, Richard, 1986, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, The Journal of Business Vol. 59,
pp. 197-216. Roll argues that firms on average pay too much for an acquisition and thus the poor post
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repurchased shares it can only proceed with purchase accounting. This is an advantage to
the long-term cash flows of the combined firms.
In order to test, I will conduct a difference in means between firms announcing
both a repurchase jointly with an acquisition and firms that announce an acquisition
without a repurchase.
Hypothesis 1
Abnormal return (at the announcement date and long-term post announcement)
will be less negative for firms that announce repurchase intentions with an
acquisition announcement than for firms that only announce the acquisition.
This test will be performed at the announcement date for announcement date
effects and also three-year and four-year post announcement.
Table 3-1 summarizes the hypotheses put forth in the literature. Most of the
hypotheses make predictions on the method of payment choice. I question why firms
would use cash to repurchase shares in order to conduct a stock-financed acquisition.
Since the bidder firm wealth is not hurt by cash acquisitions and the combined firm
wealth is, on average, better with cash, it is perplexing as to why a firm would incur
additional transactions fees and most likely incur labor costs to take this extra financing
step that at first glance does not appear to carry benefits.
I review the hypothesis with this question in mind. My sample is of firms which
either have the cash available at the repurchase announcement or did not make a credible
repurchase announcement. If they have the cash available, then according to the cash
availability hypothesis they will prefer to use it if they are undervalued. Since the firm

announcement returns should be expected. So, if firms are able to decrease the premium paid, their post
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has chosen not to use the cash for the acquisition, but rather for the repurchase, the cashavailability hypothesis suggests that the firm is overvalued. However, if the firm is
overvalued it is not likely it would choose to repurchase its own stock (see Chapter 2).
Thus, it is feasible that using cash directly to purchase another firm or using cash
indirectly with repurchased share financing is inconsequential to the cash availability
hypothesis in that both announcements are indicative of undervaluated bidder shares.
The investment opportunity hypothesis predicts that a high-growth bidder will
prefer stock because it will afford the high-growth firm with future financial flexibility.
This hypothesis is not applicable to cash flush firms with moderate growth. The signaling
hypothesis is a little problematic in that the repurchase signals undervaluation and the
subsequent stock financing signals overvaluation. Although it is unlikely that a firm sets
out to send mixed signals, it is possible that a firm prefers to use stock (ie. for risk sharing
and future tax benefits) and plans to mitigate the bad news of overvaluation indicated
with a stock financing by offsetting with the undervaluation signal of the repurchase
announcement.
The risk-sharing hypothesis is consistent with the extra financing. If a firm is
concerned about the post-merger performance of the target firm then stock financing will
mitigate this concern. Thus, if the target firm will represent a significant portion of the
combined firm, it may be the preference of the bidder firm’s managers to share the risks,
even if evidence of poor stock financed acquisitions is predominant.

returns may not be as poor.
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The target firm managers may have a preference for stock financing in order to
maintain some control in the merged firm.67 Thus, if the target is large enough in
comparison to the bidder and the target firm’s managers have some control, they may be
in the position to influence the financing decision. In the extreme, the target may be able
to influence the bidder to first repurchase its shares and then to pass the shares on to the
target firm’s shareholders. This argument may hold for the target manager shareholders;
however, the argument fails for all the other target shareholders who should prefer cash
due to the higher premium. It has also been suggested; however, that the higher premium
is nothing more than compensation for the forced tax consequences and thus the high
premium quickly disappears net of taxes.
The control hypothesis states that if a manager desires to maintain his ownership
position in the firm, he or she will prefer stock to finance an acquisition in order to
maintain control. A repurchase decreases the total outstanding shares and thus serves to
increase the ownership position of the non-tendering shareholders. Thus, managers with a
high concern for their ownership position would favor repurchase of shares first to
mitigate the loss in ownership position if a stock-financed acquisition was pursued over
the preferable cash acquisition.
Pooling accounting (stock financing) and repurchasing activities are both
consistent with manager objectives of increasing earnings per share. Thus, if a manager’s
compensation were tied to earnings per share, both repurchasing shares and stock
financed acquisitions would supplement the manager’s compensation. Thus, the pooling
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versus purchasing hypothesis would be consistent with the doubled transactions.
Furthermore, the doubled transactions may create favorable tax results. Purchase
accounting creates a tax burden on the target firm. Thus, stock financing is beneficial for
both risk-sharing and tax consequences. Cash financing has historically better returns.
Thus, it is possible that by taking on the extra transactions the firm is taking advantage of
both types of financing and entering into a win-win situation.
Finally, if it is not the method of payment that matters but only whether the
acquisition is a good fit and increases the focus of the firm, then the transactions that
preceded the acquisition may not be the important issue. This argument suggests that
although it appears inefficient to use cash to repurchase shares to be used for the
acquisition of another firm, this method of payment may not be predictive of poor postmerger stock price returns that have been documented by numerous researchers. If the
bidder acquires a firm that increases its focused line of business then value should be
enhanced and the method of payment is immaterial. Similarly, if the bidder attempts a
diversifying acquisition, the market would be expected to respond negatively.
These studies suggest that a viable control for a value-enhancing merger versus a
value-decreasing merger could be determined by whether the merger increases or
maintains its focus or decreases its focus in diversification attempts. Flanagan and
O'Shaughnessy (2003) use primary SIC codes to classify transactions core-related in their
paper that explores which firm characteristics influence the size of acquisition
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premiums.68 Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy classify an acquisition as core-related if both
the acquiring and target firms share the same three or four digit SIC code. I will separate
my firms that announce repurchase intentions to conduct an acquisition as value
enhancing if the firms have the same three or four digit SIC code and are thus corerelated focus increasing or preserving firms. Firms will be considered focus decreasing if
the acquiring and target firms do not share three or four digit SIC codes and appear unrelated.

Sample
The sample of firms announcing a repurchase in order to facilitate an acquisition
are collected from Securities Data Corporation’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and
Repurchases database. I begin by collecting all repurchase offers with an acquisition
(ACQ) purpose. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes
4910-4949) were removed because they are believed to face a different incentive
structure around repurchase activity. Imposing these restrictions results in an initial
sample of 103 firms with a repurchase announcement between 1995 and 2002. The
sample is reduced to 96 firms with usable return information available from CRSP.
Using the same database, I searched for acquisition announcement dates one year
before and one year after the sample firms’ repurchase announcement and found that
two-thirds (66) of the sample firms made both the repurchase and acquisition
announcement on the same date. Of those 66 firms, nearly one-half (32) had announced
68

Flanagan and O’ Shaughnessy, 2001 explore the relationship between relatedness and takeover premiums
and find that acquires that are not core-related to pay very high premiums when multiple bidders are
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the acquisition at a previous date in addition to the second announcement made in
conjunction with the repurchase announcement. Of the firms that did not make the
acquisition announcement of the same date as the repurchase announcement, ten of them
made the acquisition announcement prior to the repurchase announcement and eleven
made the acquisition announcement after the repurchase announcement. Subsequent to
the acquisition announcement, twelve firms withdrew their announcement.

Methodology
(See chapter 2, page 35.)
Results
Table 3-3 presents abnormal return data for my 96 firms that announce
repurchase-financed acquisitions. The returns are relative to the repurchase
announcement date with the exception of Panel C, which is at an acquisition
announcement date and Panel G which is at the repurchase withdrawal date. Panel A
shows the full sample of 96 firms. The CARs show the generally positive abnormal
returns consistent with other researchers results.
Two-thirds of the sample firms announce the repurchase and the acquisition on
the same date. The abnormal returns to this group shown in Panel B are similar, if not a
little more significant then the entire sample of firms.
Panel C is very interesting in that one-third of the repurchased-financed firms had
acquisition announcements prior to making the repurchasing announcements. Thus, at the

present. Although, the emphasis of the paper is not on the independent core-related variables, I plan to
follow their procedure for defining core-relatedness by SIC codes.
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time of the first acquisition announcement there would be little indication that the firms
planned repurchase as part of the financing. Thus, ex ante the abnormal return reaction
should be similar to all other acquisitions. Panel C, although only slightly significant,
shows generally positive results, which is contrary to the prevailing documentation on
acquisition returns.
Panel D is a very small group of only ten firms that made an acquisition
announcement and later announced a repurchase. Panel D shows very little significance
due to the small sample size.
Panel E is also a very small group. However, these eleven firms show some very
significantly positive results. These firms made their repurchase announcement in
advance of their acquisition announcement and have had exceptional market model value
weighted CARs of 96.94 percent two-years post the repurchase announcement and
159.64 percent three-years post. The beta of this group of firms is only .68 and thus the
argument of being compensated for risk does not seem viable.
Twelve of my 96 firms later withdrew their repurchase intentions. The returns of
these firms are displayed in Panel F. It appears that at the initial repurchase
announcement these firms enjoy similar positive reactions accorded to repurchase
announcing firms. Thus, there is no indication that the market expects the later
withdrawal. However, in the long run these firms do not do as well as firms that carry out
the repurchase plan. Panel G presents the same sub-sample of firms at the withdrawal
date.
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Table 3-4 directly tests hypothesis 1 and finds that prior to the acquisition
announcement both the stock-financed and cash-financed firms show the characteristic
negative abnormal returns. The repurchase group shows no abnormal returns and the
groups are not different from each other. At the acquisition announcement event date all
groups show moderate positive abnormal returns. The most interesting results begin to
appear within 90 days of the acquisition announcement where the groups become very
different from each other. The cash-financed (-1.8 percent) and stock-financed (-6.3
percent) acquisitions show negative abnormal returns, whereas the repurchase-financed
acquisition is slightly positive (1.3 percent). This distinction continues into the long-term
with significantly negative abnormal returns for both the cash-financed (-33.4percent for
two-year post) and stock-financed (-99.7 percent for two-year post) acquisitions and
significantly positive for the repurchase-financed (11.8 percent for two-year post) returns.
Thus, firms that take on the extra transactions seem to be well-compensated for their
efforts. This table strongly supports my hypothesis. Not only do these repurchasedfinanced acquisition firms not exhibit the characteristic negative abnormal returns of both
cash-financed and stock-financed, these firms show positive CARs two-years, three-years
and four-years post announcement. I attribute this to the firms reducing their tax burden
by completing a purchase accounting acquisition. Straight cash-financed acquisitions also
have this advantage; however, a cash-financed acquisition is not able to share the risk
with the target shareholders in the merged firm. Furthermore, a straight cash-financed
acquisition may have to pay a premium to target shareholders to compensate the target
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shareholders with an increase in tax burden due to their most likely gain on the stock
sale.69
Table 3-6 is a multi-model table. The five panels A-E display the coefficients for
pre-announcement, at the announcement and post-announcement time periods (30 day,
two-year and three-year). Four multi-variate models are displayed in each panel. Each
model uses a combination of control variables (market value three-year growth, threeyear sales growth, beta, earnings per share three-year growth, price to book ratio, and free
cash flow) as well as the firms’ method of acquisition payment. These models show a
dummy variable if the acquisition was financed with a repurchase or another dummy
variable if the acquisition was financed with 100 percent cash. The base case is if the
acquisition is 100-percent stock financed, and thus the parameter is zero and is not
shown.
Panel A shows the cumulative abnormal returns prior to the acquisition
announcement. There appears to be no difference in the abnormal return performance of
the sample of firms based on their method of financing their acquisitions prior to the
announcement.
Panel B displays the event-date announcement CARs. At the announcement three
of the models show significant positive coefficients for both cash-financed acquisitions in
comparison to the base case of the stock-financed acquisition, and one model shows
significant positive coefficients for the repurchased-financed acquisitions. Panel C

69

As an aside it may be that some firms with available cash do not take advantage of this double
transactional step due to the advantage of cash-financed acquisitions being quick, allowing firms to avoid
undue competition.
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displays the short-term stock price reactions from two-days to 30-days post
announcement. This time period’s results are very similar to the announcement-event
period return. However, the size-control variable; market value growth for the last three
years, and the risk control variable; beta, both show negative coefficients. As shown in
the first two panels, panel C also displays a very small R-square.
Panels D and E show very interesting results and also much higher R –squares
(ranging between 26 and 41 percent) for the two-years and three-years post
announcement, respectively. During these time periods, we find that the coefficients for
the cash-financed acquisition are mixed and not significant in comparison to the stockfinanced acquisition. However, in the long-term the repurchase acquisition group’s
coefficients become strongly significantly positive. Consistent with table 3- 4, it appears
that firms that finance acquisitions with repurchased shares do very well in the long term.
Similarly to chapter 2, ExecuComp data was obtained for the three types of
distinct acquisition financing groups. Data on 175 firms using only cash financing, 100
firms using only stock financing and only three firms using repurchases financing were
found. Due to the extremely small sample size of the repurchasing acquisition firms, no
further testing was attempted to differentiate the officers’ stock ownership or options.
There was, however, information that could be obtained through the compustat
database to differentiate the firm choice of acquisition financing. The mean market value
of the firms, the return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), net income, and free
cash flows for all three groups of firms is shown in table 3-5. Firms choosing to
repurchase shares to finance an acquisition are larger, have higher returns on assets and
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returns on equity and have significantly higher free cash flows. Furthermore, all firms
that conduct repurchases financing have positive net incomes during the year of the
acquisition whereas; only 80 percent of the cash-financed firms and 73 percent of the
stock-financed firms can make the same claim.
Conclusion
Firms that take on the extra transactional step of repurchasing shares to finance an
acquisition are well compensated for their efforts, especially in the long run. These firms
have cash available and positive earnings but on average have negative abnormal returns
prior to their repurchase announcements. Thus, these firms are likely to be undervalued
and therefore choose this method of financing to signal undervaluation in the market
place. These firms experience risk sharing with the target firms, counteract the negative
effects of dilution by repurchasing shares first, and enjoy a tax advantage for their efforts.
My results raise the question as to why more firms do not take advantage of this
win-win situation. Aboddy, Kasnik and Williams (2000) argued that managers should
prefer pooling accounting because all else equal, purchase accounting hurts net income
and earning per share for years to come. I suggest that since management compensation
is likely tied to these performance measures, most managers do prefer pooling
accounting. However, this is shortsighted.
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Table 3-2 Variable Definitions
Beta = CRSP beta.
Cash 100% = Bidding firm acquired target firm with 100 percent cash financing.
EPS growth = EPSgrow = the three-year least squares annual growth rate of Net Income
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less preferred dividend
requirements (ExecuComp EPSEX3LS).
Free CF = The free cash flow concept is Operating Activities - Net Cash Flow minus
Cash Dividends minus Capital Expenditures (Compustat OANCF-DV-CAPX).
Market Value = This data item provides a pre-calculated company-level market value
based upon the sum of all the company’s trading issues multiplied by their respective
closing price (Compustat PRCC * CSHO) and is reported in millions of dollars.
Market Value3 = The 3-year least squares annual growth rate in market value
(ExecuComp MKTVAL3LS).
NI = The income or loss reported in millions of dollars by a company after expenses and
losses have been subtracted from all revenues and gains for the fiscal period including
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Compustat annual data item A172).
Price to book = The market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the
market value of assets is the book value of assets plus the market value of equity
(Compustat item #24 times Compustat item #25) minus the book value of equity.
ROA = Return on Assets is Income Before Extraordinary Items - Available for Common,
divided by Total Assets, which is defined as the sum of current assets, net property, plant,
and equipment, and other non-current assets. This is then multiplied by 100 (Compustat
IBCOM/AT)*100.
Repurchase = Bidding firm acquired target firm with repurchased shares.
ROE = Return on Equity is Income Before Extraordinary Items - Available for Common,
defined as income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less preferred
dividend requirements, but before adding savings due to common stock equivalents,
divided by Common Equity - Total, which is defined as the common shareholders'
interest in the company. The result is multiplied by 100 (Compustat IBCOM/CEQ)*100).
Sales3 = The 3-year least squares annual growth rate in sales (ExecuComp SALES3LS).
Stock 100% = Bidding firm acquired target firm with 100 percent stock financing.
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Table 3-3 Repurchase to Fund an Acquisition
Cumulative Abnormal Market Model Returns (CARs) for both equal
and value weighted portfolios of firms announcing a repurchase from
1995-2002 for the purpose of conducting an acquisition.
Panel A: All Firms Announcing Repurchase Plans to Fund an
Acquisition. (n = 96, mean beta = 0.75). Abnormal returns are relative
to the repurchase announcement date.
Window
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30-2
-2.84%
-2.67%
-1.14%
-3.64%
-1,+1
1.57% **
1.68% ***
1.67% **
1.56% **
+2,+30
0.91%
1.97%
1.05%
1.27%
29.42% ***
30.47% *** 49.41% ***
17.94% ***
+31,+504
+31,+756
41.49% ***
45.92% *** 72.15% ***
26.75% ***
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
Panel B: This panel is a sub-sample of panel A. This sub-sample
includes the firms making both announcements on the same date. (n =
66, mean beta = 0.92)
Window
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30-2
-1.05%
-0.39%
-1.42%
-0.80%
-1,+1
2.31% ***
2.36% ***
2.29% ***
2.25% ***
+2,+30
2.40%
3.22%
2.02%
2.73%
34.20% **
34.78% **
32.22% ***
30.82% **
+31,+504
46.11% **
50.36% *** 42.37% ***
44.05% ***
+31,+756
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
Panel C: This panel is a sub-sample of panel B. The repurchase and the
acquisition were announced on the same date, however the acquisition
also had an earlier announcement. (n = 32, mean beta = 0.90)
Window
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30-2
3.98%
4.65% *
3.64%
3.82%
-1,+1
1.27% *
1.28% *
1.18% *
1.43% *
1.40%
0.16%
0.64%
0.27%
+2,+30
15.11% *
16.68% *
13.18% *
13.93%
+31,+504
30.72% **
32.77% **
28.93% **
29.81%
+31,+756
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
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Table 3-3 Repurchase to Fund an Acquisition (continued)
Panel D: This is a sub-sample of firms that only announced their
acquisition intentions in advance of their repurchase announcement. The
returns are shown relative to the repurchase announcement. (n=10,
mean beta = 0.76)
Window
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30-2
-6.16%
-3.01%
-4.52%
-2.82%
-1,+1
0.83%
1.42%
0.89%
1.35%
-4.59%
-1.12%
-4.47%
-1.46%
+2,+30
-1.39%
15.07%
1.95%
16.96%
+31,+504
1.17%
24.83%
6.42%
29.59%
+31,+756
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
Panel E: This sub-sample of firms made acquisition announcements and
a subsequent repurchase announcement. The returns are shown relative
to the repurchase announcement. (n=11, mean beta 0.68)
Window
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30-2
-1.50%
-1.86%
-2.05%
-2.66%
-1,+1
2.88%
3.08%
2.89%
2.97%
11.86%
10.17%
12.29% *
11.01%
+2,+30
93.94% ***
96.94% *** 91.29% ***
98.81% ***
+31,+504
+31,+756 158.45% *** 159.64% *** 151.81% *** 163.23% ***
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
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Table 3-3 Repurchase to Fund an Acquisition (continued)
Panel F: A small sub-sample of firms announced repurchases and later
withdrew. This is at the repurchase announcement date. (n=12, beta =
1.18)
Window
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
2.93%
1.42%
-30-2
2.18%
1.69%
-1,+1
2.00% **
1.62% *
2.04% **
1.64% *
+2,+30
1.39%
0.24%
1.00%
0.11%
-18.90%
-19.49%
-17.79%
-21.54%
+31,+504
-22.62%
-32.44%
-20.08%
-34.58%
+31,+756
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
Panel G: A small sub-sample of firms announced repurchases and later
withdrew. This is at the withdrawal date. (n=12, beta = 0.92)
Window
Market Model
Scholes-Williams
Equal Wt
Value Wt
Equal Wt
Value Wt
-30-2
0.46%
-0.88%
0.92%
-0.44%
-1,+1
-1.37% *
-1.30% *
-1.34% *
-1.22% *
+2,+30
0.69%
1.95%
0.70%
1.66%
6.75%
8.86%
3.07%
8.95%
+31,+504
5.32%
5.10%
3.26%
5.71%
+31,+756
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, *** significant at .01
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3-4

Comparison of Acquisition with and without a Repurchase

CARs using the market model are shown for firms announcing an acquisition from 1995
– 2002. The firms are separated into firms that also announced a plan to repurchase stock
in conjunction with the acquisition announcement (Repurchase) and firms that financed
the acquisition with 100 percent cash (Cash) and firms that financed the acquisition with
100 percent stock (Stock). ANOVA differences follow for the group differences of the
abnormal returns for the seven event time periods: 30 days to two days prior to the
acquisition announcement (-30, -2), the event period (-1, +1), 30 days postannouncement (+2, +30), 90 days post-announcement (+31, +90), one-year, two-years,
and three-years post-announcement (+31, +252), (+31, +504), (+31, +756), respectively.
Repurchase
Cash 100%
Stock 100%
P-value
Beta
0.98
1.12
1.24
n
436
9205
4497
(-30,-2)
0.000
-0.005 *** -0.006
0.960
(-1,+1)
0.005
*
0.011
***
0.009
0.449
(+2,+30)
0.013
*
-0.018 *** -0.063
***
0.000
(+31,+90)
-0.018 *** -0.041 *** -0.102
***
0.000
(+31,+252)
0.009
-0.158 *** -0.441
***
0.000
(+31,+504)
0.118
*** -0.334 *** -0.997
***
0.001
(+31,+756)
0.199
*** -0.417 *** -1.355
***
0.199

Table 3-5 Acquiring Firm Characteristics
Data is obtained from Compustat for market value, return on assets, return on equity, net
income and free cash flows for firms choosing to acquire firms by financing with
repurchases, cash, and stock. Mean values are shown.
Market Value ROA
ROE
NI
Free Cash Flow
Repurchase
14,327
3.6
15.2
1,122
1,962
Cash 100%
9,425
1.3
1.2
261
164
Stock 100%
6,955
-175.2
-5.3
145
48
p-value
0.004
0.277
0.353
0.000
0.000
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Table 3 - 6 Market Reaction to Type of Financed Acquisition
Announcement
The acquisitions are financed by a repurchase, 100 percent stock or 100
percent cash. Shown are the dummy variables if the acquisition was
financed with a repurchase and financed with cash, otherwise stock. (tstatistics in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significant levels at 1%,
5% and 10% levels). Models include firms announcing acquisitions
from 1995 to 2002. Returnit = b0 + b1Xit + b2year Indicators + eit
A. Return for (-30, -2)
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Intercept
0.01705
0.02048
-0.02080
0.00551
(0.84)
(1.03)
(-3.52)
(0.76)
Dummy if cash -0.00939
-0.01214
0.02319 *** -0.01197
(-.0.60)
(-0.78)
(4.52)
(-1.58)
Dummy if rep.
-0.06016
-0.06254
0.01239
-0.00790
(-1.00)
(-1.05)
(1.14)
(-0.42)
Mkt Val 3 year
0.00015
0.00014
0.00004
-0.00008
(0.97)
(0.91)
(1.37)
(-1.50)
Sales 3 year
-0.00019
-0.00017
-0.00007
0.00006
(-0.66)
(-0.61)
(-0.97)
(0.94)
Beta
-0.02375 ** -0.02517 ** 0.00081
(-2.01)
(-2.17)
(0.30)
EPS 3 year
-0.00020
-0.00020 *
(-1.63)
(-1.65)
0.00012
Price/Book
0.00023
(0.37)
(0.19)
Free cash flow
0.00000
(-0.25)
R-square
0.0121
0.0126
0.0178
0.0017
n
782
793
1235
2664
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Appendix A: T-Test
The time series standard deviation method (t-test) calculates a single variance
estimate for the entire portfolio. Its drawback is that it does not take into consideration
unequal return variance across securities. However, on the other hand, it does avoid
potential problems of cross-sectional correlation of security returns. The estimated
variance of AARt is
Σ (AA Rt –AARmean)2
σ=
D-2
where D = estimation period and
Σ AA Rt
AARmean =
D
and the portfolio test statistic for day t is

t=

AA Rt
σAAR

and the test statistic for CAART1T2, assuming time-series independence is
CAA Rt______
t = (T2-T1+1)1/2 σAAR
In order to calculate the z test statistic, it is assumed under the null hypothesis that Ajt has
mean zero and variance σ2Ajt. The maximum likelihood estimate of the variance is
1
(Rmt-Rmmean)2
S2Ajt = S2Aj 1 + Dj + Σ (Rmt-Rmmean)2
where

S2Ajt = Σ A2jk / (Dj – 2)

Rmt is the observed return on the market index on day t, Rmmean is the mean market
return over the estimation period and Dj is the number of non-missing trading day returns
in the D-day interval. The standardized abnormal return is defined as
SARjt = Ajt/SAjt
Under the null, each SARjt follows a student’s t distribution with Dj-2 degrees of
freedom. Summing SARjt across the sample
TSARt = Σ SARjt
and the expected variance of TSARt is
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Qt = Σ (Dj – 2) / (Dj – 4)
and the test statistic for the null hypothesis that CARRT1T2 = 0 is
ZT1,T2 = 1 / N1/2 Σ Z T1T2,
where
ZT1,T2 = 1/ Q T1,T2 1/2 Σ SARjt
and

QT1T2 = (T2 – T1 + 1) (Dj – 2) / (Dj – 4)
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